

A study of Japan's Anti-Yuan Policy, 1915-1916

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The monarchical movement of Yuan Shih-k'ai was not only a crisis in the Chinese Republic, but also a turning point in the fortune of the Northern Warlords.¹ It has a tremendous impact on the later development of the political situation. Why the monarchical movement should appear so soon after the 1911 Revolution, its causes, and its historical background are the subjects worth investigating. The Anti-monarchist movement appeared just as soon, and developed into a united front—the Anti-monarchy Army. And Japan was closely involved with the anti-Yuan movement.

Yuan's monarchical movement was a domestic issue. But as it began during World War I, it got involved with the international politics of the Powers, especially Japan. The Anti-monarchists were able to force Yuan to abolish the Hung-hsien monarchy because of unmitigated support from Japan. Japan's intervention dealt the Hung-hsien monarchy a fatal blow. A study on Yuan's monarchical movement will not be complete unless it includes an analysis of Japan's actions. This paper is an attempt to throw light on Japan's China policy during this period—how it was formulated, and how it developed.

1. Agitation for the Hung-hsien Monarchy

The Chinese Republic, after the 1911 Revolution, was shaky in almost every respect. During the Second Revolution, the

prevailing mood of "peace at any cost" ² convinced Yuan that he could have his own way with the threat to resort to the use of force. It also whetted his appetite for the throne. From the nature of the Northern Warlords, and from the way Yuan usurped the government, it was clear that the Yuan regime had never shaken itself free of the dynastic pattern of thinking. ³ In order to establish a dictatorial rule, Yuan not only forced the provisional Government to move its seat to Peking, but also resorted to everything — threat to use force, or money, whichever was convenient — to destroy the Constitution. He also emasculated the Council of Ministers. ⁴ Because of his jealousy, Yuan had a Kuomintang leader, Sung Chiao-jen, assassinated in the spring of 1913. Sung's assassination touched off anti-Yuan sentiments among the Revolutionaries in the South, and led to the Second Revolution. The failure of the Second Revolution was due in part to the weakness and confusion among the rank and file of the Kuomintang, and the superior force of the Northern Warlords. But it was the support of the Imperialists — the Reorganization Loan of 25 million pounds — that played a decisive role. ⁵ That perhaps was the peak of Yuan's political career. From then on, he maneuvered towards the throne at will, but the fact was that he had turned the corner, and started downhill in his career.

Yuan used his consummate political skills to destroy party politics. And yet he was able to win the presidency of the Republic, the post he coveted. In 1914, he had the Provisional Constitution amended, abolishing the Cabinet, and making the President head of the government. Assisted by a Minister of State, the President now assumed dictatorial powers. ⁷ Before long the publication of "New Constitution" vastly maximizing the Presidential powers, which were no different from imperial prerogatives. At the end of the same year, Yuan hinted to the Political Council,

then acting as a legislative body , to recommend to the Constitutional Compact Conference that the Presidential Election Law be revised to extend the term of the President to ten years , and to provide for as many re-elections as the President wished. The President was further to be empowered to recommend his successor.⁸

Yuan had virtually become President for life. In addition, he announced plans to worship Confucius and Heaven , another indication of Yuan's ambitions for the throne.⁹

The First World War broke out when Yuan was building up and consolidating his absolute power. The Western Powers were too preoccupied with the fighting in Europe to be concerned with the affairs in the East , leaving the field open to Japan , now the only imperial power asserting itself in Asia. Japan seized an opportunity to declare war on Germany and landing troops in Shantung to take over the German concessions there. It also thrust the Twenty-one Demands on China ! The Peking Government knuckled under to the Japanese threat , but the capitulation touched off loud cries of protest from the people , and incited anti-Japanese sentiments.¹⁰ But Yuan was too far gone in his dream of becoming an emperor to heed people's wishes. He suppressed the incipient nationalism for a compromise with the imperialists.¹¹ Soon after the Sino-Japanese negotiations for the Twenty-one Demands began , the monarchists became very active. In August 1915 , Yang Tu invited Yuan's American adviser , Dr. Frank J. Goodnow , to write a memorandum , arguing that republican form of government was not suitable to China.¹² Yuan's Japanese adviser , Dr. Ariga Nagao (Yuan's Japanese Adviser) , was also persuaded to publish an article contending that Japan owed its success to the fact that it adopted constitutional monarchy. The

article was deliberately equivocal.¹³ But it was to find an echo in later remarks of the Japanese Prime Minister, Marquis Ōkuma Shigenobu.

In mid-August, Yang Tu and five others organized a Ch'ou An Hui (Society of Planning for Peace) to set the monarchical movement in motion in the open.¹⁴ Liang Shih-i and others joined the movement by organizing the " National Petitioners' Association " to petition the Council of State. In late September, the Council of State resolved to convene a National Congress of Representatives to decide the issue.¹⁵ The monarchical movement had taken a big stride forward.

The monarchical movement owed its initial success in part to Yuan's personality, the domestic political situation as well as development on the international scene. First, there were Yuan's personal ambitions. Some writers suggest that Yuan wanted to become an emperor himself even before the last Manchu emperor abdicated.¹⁶ Nobody, however, could say for sure when Yuan began to harbor imperial ambitions. Besides the argument would be academic. But it was clear that after the 1911 Revolution, the circumstances were advantageous to the man with imperial ambitions. Yuan's admiration for Emperor Meiji of Japan and Kaiser Wilhelm was another indication.¹⁷ Yuan's obsession with " legened ", his fear of dying " young " which he believed ran in the family¹⁸ were also factors that prompted Yuan to seek the throne. Urging by members of his family too played a significant role. Of Yuan's family members, his eldest son, Yuan K'e-ting, was the most ardent supporter of the movement. The " mutiny " in 1911, during which " rebellious soldiers " were about to make Yuan an emperor¹⁹; spreading the idea in 1913-14 that the republican form of government was not

suitable to China ; and a meeting in January 1915 which was used to sound out reactions to the monarchy (to which Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was invited) all involved Yuan K'e-ting ²⁰. These give credence to the saying " Yuan Shih-K'ai 30 per cent and Yuan K'e-ting 70 per cent " , i. e., Yuan K'e-ting was much more interested in becoming a crownprince than his father an emperor. ²¹ But if one considers the personality of Yuan Shih-K'ai and his propensity for ruse, one will see that Yuan K'e-ting was not more than a catalyst. Yuan Shih-K'ai was an opportunist, a man of ruse, who was quick to take advantage of the circumstances. The support of his generals after the 1911 Revolution, ²² and the "Restoration" of 1914 ²³ were used to his advantage in paving the way for his accession the throne. Factional fight within the Yuan regime was also one of the factors behind the monarchical movement. The struggle for power between the Anhwei clique, headed by Yang Shih-ch'i, and the Kwangtung faction (Communications Clique) , led by Liang Shih-i , was indeed fierce. In the summer of 1915 , the Monarchists instigated the " Impeachment of Three Vice Ministers " , which was followed by the " Impeachment of (Directors of) Five Railways " . Both were designed to embarrass the Kwangtung clique. ²⁴ In order to counter the move against his clique , Liang abandoned his thitherto lukewarm support , and threw himself into the whole-heartedly into the promotion of the monarchical movement. That was the reason behind the organization by Liang of the National Petitioners Association. As a result , the Communication Clique returned to favor. The monarchical movement made a big stride forward with the participation of Liang and his clique. ²⁵

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On the international scene , the situation was delicate. During the 1911 Revolution , Britain was the country among the Powers that exercised the strongest influence on Chinese situation.

Britain's policy objective was to maintain stability in China in order to protect its interest in the country. In its judgement, neither the Ch'ing Court nor the Revolutionaries could maintain peace and stability in China, so Britain turned to support a third party, a "Strong Man-Yuan" Shih-k'ai. From then on, Britain stuck to the Yuan regime.²⁶ The outbreak of war in Europe, however, changed the situation. Japan gradually replaced Britain as the most influential power in the Far East.²⁷

Britain was beginning to feel pinched in its support for the Peking regime, but it had to back Yuan up the best it could, if only just to counter German moves. For Germany too was trying to win China to its side. As a result, both Britain and Germany showed sympathy towards the monarchical movement.²⁸ Thus the Monarchists were most worried about the reaction of Japan.

But now that China had acquiesced to most of Japan's Twenty-one Demands, they thought Japan would not interfere. They thought they could go ahead with the monarchical movement without constraint.²⁹ It was under these favorable domestic and external circumstances that the Monarchists proceeded.

2, Japan's Initial Reaction

Japan's China policy differed somewhat from that of most Western Powers. The latter were concerned with economic gains, and did not resort to the use of force unless it was called for. But in the case of Japan, it had, besides economic gains, territorial ambitions. The use of force was the common order of the day. Since the Western Powers were after economic gains, they advocated the "open door" and the integrity of Chinese territory. At the same time they wanted to see China ruled by a unified government or a strong leader that could maintain law and order in the country. It was not so with Japan. Japan would gain most if China remained confused and in disarray. Its tra-

ditional trick was to create confrontation in China between the two camps , North vs. South , so that it could fish in troubled water. Thus Japan opted for a two-front diplomacy , as was shown during the 1911 Revolution and the Second Revolution .³⁰ So it was during the monarchical movement. Japan was most adroit in employing this traditional pattern of aggression against China.

During the negotiations of the Twenty-one Demands, Japan alternated inducement with pressure. Thus it instigated the Revolutionaries and the Manchu loyalists to oppose and pressure Yuan.³¹ The " Recommendations for Solution of the China Problems " , authored by Uchida Ryōhei and considered as the prototype for the subsequent Twenty-one Demands , contained proposals to support and instigate the anti-Yuan movement with a view to toppling the Peking regime.³² But with " coordination with the Powers " in mind , the Japanese government did not take any drastic action against the Yuan regime. It was evident that Japan had not yet shaken itself free of the traditional diplomacy , which was advocated by its Genrō (or elder statesmen) .³³

What effects the negotiations of the Twenty-one Demands had on the monarchical movement remains an open question. The Revolutionists believed , and some scholars support the contention , that Yuan asked Japan to support the monarchical movement in exchange for accepting the Twenty-one Demands. There is positive evidence , however .³⁴ Wang Yun-sheng and several others argue to the contrary.³⁵ Still , the possibility cannot be ruled out that men like Japanese Prime Minister Ōkuma and Japanese Minister to China Hioki Eki , who were all aware of Yuan's ambitions , had given Yuan pledges of support by word of mouth.³⁶

Various quarters in Japan paid close attention to the monarchical

cal movement during its incipient stage. The press showed keen interest.³⁷ Japanese diplomats in China did their best to collect information. They judged that the monarchical movement was for real, and watched the activities of the Monarchists closely.³⁸ When the Ch'ou An Hui was organized, and the monarchical movement was promoted in the open, Japan turned to examining the possibilities of anti-Yuan movement, and closely watched the anti-Yuan camp in Shanghai and the public opinion in South China.³⁹

While watching the progress of the monarchical movement closely, Japan persuaded Yuan to become an emperor. Ariga Nagao and Japanese Minister Hioki had all spoken in favor of the monarchical movement.⁴⁰ The most decisive, however, was the open support of Prime Minister Ōkuma. Though Ōkuma called Yuan tricky, he had great respect for Yuan's ability. The two men were also close to each other.⁴¹ In August, Ōkuma became concurrently Foreign Minister of Japan. And in early September, he made a statement to the press on the "Form of Government in China", in which he praised Yuan's ability in running the government, and suggested that Chinese political realities demanded a monarchy.⁴² The statement was extremely provocative, but it should not be viewed as a "policy statement". British Minister to Japan, William Conyngham Greene, termed it as an "irresponsible utterance".⁴³ And indeed it was. The Monarchists, however, were extremely pleased. They thought that the last obstacle to the monarchy had been removed. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the Ōkuma utterance served as a catalyst for the monarchy. John N. Jordan, British Minister to China, also considered the Ōkuma utterance instigative and provocative.⁴⁴ Since his service in Korea early in his career, Yuan

had known the Japanese , and had had 'bitter experiences in his dealings with them.. He knew the Japanese were ambitious and that they would stop at nothing. But Yuan was so obsessed with his own ambitions that he was unwittingly made a fool of by the Japanese. The fact was that since the outbreak of the war in Europe, Yuan had suffered a serious case of " Japanophobia ". In foreign policy , he toed the Japanese line , while at home he " had no continuity of policy , no constructive statecraft ".⁴⁵

Not long after his statement to the press , Ōkuma instructed Japanese diplomats in China to restrain the reporters from expressing opinions on the monarchical movement of attacking Yuan.⁴⁶ The instruction might be construed as " quiet noninterference ".⁴⁷ But it was already clear that Japan had bared its true intention to interfere at an opportune time , and that it was preparing the ground for intervention later. On September 6 , Ōkuma summoned Chinese Minister to Japan Lu Tsung-yü to warn against a hasty change of government.⁴⁸ Evidently , Japan was playing it both ways.

3. The Formation of Japan's Anti-Yuan Policy

Japan's policy towards China had never been consistent. Inconsistency was particularly conspicuous after the 1911 Revolution. It was all the more so during the negotiations of the Twenty-one Demands.⁴⁹ The Genrō advocated a China policy that slightly differed from that of the Japanese government. After the Twenty-one Demands , the Genrō proposed to send a special 九 envoy to China to promote the relations between the two countries. In September , a proposal to send " goodwill ambassador " was submitted to the government. Both moves were closely related with the monarchical movement. The two countries , however ,

failed to reach any accord.⁵⁰ After this , Japan became much more aggressive in its attitude.

It was by then clear that Japan was prepared to stop the monarchioal movement. But since the movement was still in its early stage , Japan adopted a " wait-and-see " attitude. the general public and the army in Japan , however , were critical of Japanese government's passive attitude. The army was especially agitated.⁵¹ Japan needed chaos in China as an excuse for intervention in the monarchical movement , and it thought " change in government would bring about chaos ".⁵² As a result , it instructed the Japanese organizations in China (such as the legations , the army , and the South Manchurian Railway) to collect possible reactions to a change in the form of government. They arrived at the following conclusions : (1) The monarchical movement was being promoted in earnest. In the Peking government , only a few , such as Chang Chien and Hsiung Hsi-ling (civil officials) and Tuan Ch'i-jui (military) , were against it. Others would go along. (2) Most people in China showed little concern , people in South China (especially Shanghai) showed some opposition , but their influence was limited. That had led Japanese Consul General in Shanghai , Ariyoshi Akira and others, to conclude that there would be no serious disturbances even if China changed to the monarchy.⁵³ If so , it would deprive Japan of as an excuse to intervene. It needed disturbances as excuse to intervene. That was one of the reasons why Japan supported anti-Yuan movement in South China.

Japan was all set to intervene in the monarchical movement. Following the instruction of September on collecting information on the progress of the monarchical movement and its possible conse-

quences, the Japanese government cabled the Japanese Ambassador to Britain, Inoue Katsunosuke, to sound out the British government on its views towards the monarchical movement.

Inoue was instructed to call Britain's attention to two points: one was to stress that the anti-Yuan sentiments were high in the lower reaches of the Yangtze, and the change to monarchy might entail disturbances that would be inimical to the interests of Japan and Britain. He was also to relay the rumor that Germany might recognize the monarchy ahead of others so which might induce Britain to go along with Japan's intervention.⁵⁴ That was the beginning of the change in the Japanese attitude from "wait and see" to that of active intervention. Thenceforward, Japan secretly supported the anti-Yuan camps in their rise against Yuan, while collecting information on the anti-Yuan activities. It exaggerated the seriousness of the anti-Yuan movement. This was reminiscent of Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu's instruction (on the eve of the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895) to the Japanese envoy to Korea to exaggerate the seriousness of disturbances in Korea as a pretext to dispatch troops.⁵⁵

But why did Japan change its attitude? There were a number of reasons that led Japan to adopt an active course of action: First, discontent with the Twenty-one Demands. After the "national humiliation", anti-Japanese sentiments were high in China. Both the government and people of China in one way or another prevented Japan from enjoying its "rights as provided under the treaties", for instance, disputes on the lease of land in Manchuria, and promulgation of "Statutes for the Punishment of Traitors".⁵⁶ That had so angered the "March North" advocates in Japan that they began arguing that unless the Yuan regime was toppled and obstacles to Japan's expansionist policy removed, Japan's China policy could not be implemented.⁵⁷ Under the

circumstances, the Ōkuma Cabinet was naturally inclined to an active policy of intervention. Second, German made overtures to China. The war in Europe was at its height at this time. Germany made several overtures to China during this time as discussed above. That was something Japan could not tolerate. Ōkuma had given Sino-German collaboration as a justification for Japanese intervention.⁵⁸ Third, Pressure from the extremist. Uchida Ryohei advocated a stratagem of gradually strangling the Yuan regime in his "Opinions on the Monarchy in China".⁵⁹ Somura Yasunobu had some reservations on this stratagem.⁶⁰ But this writer believes that when Uchida submitted his "Opinions on China Policy" to government leaders in August,⁶¹ he was not only speaking for Rōnin (continental adventurers) groups, but also for the general public in Japan on Japan's China policy. Later evidence shows that Uchida's opinions had undoubtedly had an influence on Japan's China policy.

At first, the Monarchists were unaware of the change in Japanese attitude. They went ahead with their preparations. They were encouraged firstly by the Japanese Prime Minister's utterances, and then by the widely-touted pro-monarchy counsel of the British Minister.⁶² The Monarchists proceeded eagerly. Meanwhile, as Japan sensed that a change in the form of government was imminent, it prepared a preliminary policy of intervention. In mid-October, Acting Minister Obata Torikichi was instructed to inquire of the Yuan regime if it was sure it could change into a monarchy without provoking serious disturbances.⁶³ Soon after that, Japan's new Foreign Minister, Ishii Kikujiro, returned to Tokyo; and active intervention was discussed in earnest.⁶⁴ On October 15, the Japanese Cabinet approved a resolution to warn the Yuan regime and to invite Britain to take joint

action. And after Britain's agreement was obtained , Japan intended to approach Russia , France , and the United States to join in as well.⁶⁵

At first , the British government accepting the recommendations of Minister Jordan , decided to keep its hands off the movement. But because of the war in Europe , Britain could not afford to disregard the Anglo-Japanese Alliance , and so decided to go along with Japan. Japanese exaggeration of the seriousness of anti-Yuan activities also swayed the British decision. Accordingly , Britain agreed to join Japan in issuing a warning to Yuan.⁶⁶ Before long , Russia too decided to join. So on October 28 , a Note of Advice in the name of Japan , Britain and Russia was delivered to the Chinese Foreign Office.⁶⁷ Later , France and Italy also joined the Japanese-sponsored advice. Now it became an advice from five nations instead of three.⁶⁸ The United States , however , stuck to its policy of noninterference with domestic affairs of other nations , and so refused to join in the advice.⁶⁹

The advice took the Peking government by surprise , and it tried in vain to head it off.⁷⁰ The Chinese Foreign Office later handed a reply to the legations of the three nations , declining in polite terms to accept the advice.⁷¹ The Monarchists realized that Japan held the key to the problem , and tried to soften the Japanese attitude through various quarters , such as asking Russian Minister to Japan N. M. Maléwitch to use his good offices which failed.⁷² They also tried to win the support and sympathy of various countries through diplomatic channels , even officailly announcing a delay in changing to a monarchy as gesture of accepting the advice.⁷³ But in spite of diplomatic adversity , a " refer-

endum " on the form of government was taken , and " popular support " was concocted. In mid-December , Yuan accepted the throne , and named 1916 as the First Year of Hung-hsien (Grand Constitutional) Era. ⁷⁴

There was at this juncture a letup in Japanese intervention because of the problem of persuading China to join in the war. Britain , France and Russia all wanted China to join in the war , albeit on different motives . And all tried to win the understanding of Japan. All wanted China to sever relations with Germany and Austria. , expel German nationals from China , and offer arms to the Allies , and some weapons to Russia. ⁷⁵ In the meantime , German Minister to China Admiral von Hintze was also active. ⁷⁶ Each for its selfish interests , the belligerents were prepared to recognize the monarchy in return for Yuan's acceptance of their demands. ⁷⁷

Though Britain , France and Russia were anxious to induce China to go into war , they got no satisfactory reply of commitment. Japan was opposed to Chinese participation in the war. The reasons were : first , China as a belligerent on the side of the Entente Powers would participate in the postwar peace conference where it might bring up the Twenty-one Demands and disputes on other Japanese concessions , which might be detrimental to Japan's vested interests. ⁷⁸ Second , Japan instinctively thought that non-belligerent China would be easier to control , and good for the interests of Japan. ⁷⁹ On December 3 , the Japanese cabinet approved the above policy. ⁸⁰ Japan then made an official representation to that effect to Britain , France and Russia. ⁸¹ The true intention of Japan was to put China under its exclusive control. ⁸² Later the Powers persuaded China to declare war , but to no avail. ⁸³

China at that time was ill-prepared to join the war. Though there were some , such as Liang Shih-i and G. E. Morrison , who advocated participation ,⁸⁴ Yuan and the Monarchists never seriously considered it. They thought that the participation in the war might distract them from the monarchy. Moreover , Yuan and most others in China still believed that Germany would win the war !⁸⁵ But the main reason was that Yuan dared not disregard Japanese wishes.⁸⁶

Britain and France were offended by Japan's opposition to Chinese participation on the war. In Japan , the Genrō were opposed to Japan's tough attitude towards Yuan. As a result , Foreign Minister Ishii softened his attitude towards the monarchy. Thus on December 15 , Japanese Minister Hioki and the Ministers of Britain , Russia , France and Italy made yet another representation to Yuan. That was their second advice against the monarchical scheme. But the words were toned down.⁸⁷ It would seem that the Powers were at last going along with the monarchy, but that was not the case. Constrained by the diplomatic realities, Japan was adopting a wait-and-see attitude only temporarily. Secretly it was planning on active support of the anti-Yuan forces. Japan's General Staff was the prime mover of the plan.⁸⁸ On December 25 , after the " Shanghai Incident " ,⁸⁹ the Anti-Monarchy Army rose against Yuan in Yunnan. The scene was set for a confrontation between North and South China.

4. Establishment of Japan's Anti-Yuan Policy— Collapse of the Hung-hsien Monarchy

Japan was able to find excuses and create rifts , among the Chinese because the seeds of dimension were already there.

At this time , the anti-Yuan movement was only in the making. It still had not come out into the open. According to Li Chien-nung and Hatano Yoshihiro , the anti-Yuan forces were divided into two camps , one active and the other passive. The public support that Yuan enjoyed in 1913 was gone ; instead there appeared passive resistance to his rule.⁹⁰ Such staunch supporters of the Manchu Imperial House as K'ang Yu-wei and Chang Hsün , some men among Yuan's own Peiyang Clique (notably Hsü Shih-ch'ang among the civilians and Tuan Ch'i-jui and Feng Kuo-chang among the military) , and some officials in the Peking government were among the passive resisters to the monarchy. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Chung Hwa Ke Ming Tang (Chinese Revolutionary Party) , Kuomintang moderates headed by Huang Hsing , and the Progressive Party were the active anti-Yuan forces.⁹¹ Among them , the Progressive Party was the most ardent anti-Yuan activist group , as evidenced by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's anti-Yuan propaganda in the press, and Ts'ai O's Anti-Monarchy Army.⁹²

The anti-Yuan uprising in Yunnan was planned by Ts'ai O , with the support of T'ang Chi-yao. But the nucleus of the Yunnan Uprising consisted of the junior officers in the New Army of Yunnan. With the overthrow of the Yuan regime as the common objective , the Anti-Monarchy Army , the Progressives under Liang Ch'i-ch'ao , and the right wing of the Kuomintang (headed by Li Lieh-chün and Li Ken-Yuan) formed a sort of united front.⁹³ All of the leading figures, Ts'ai , Liang , and the two Li's had connections with Japan. Japan went all out to support these anti-Yuan figures. For instance , Ts'ai O's escape to Yunnan and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's visit to Kwangsi were arranged and financed by the Japanese from behind the scenes.⁹⁴ Moreover , the Japanese General Staff sent officers to Yunnan , and at the same time dis-

patched Aoki Nobuzumi to Shanghai as a liaison officer.⁹⁵ Japanese military aid was given extensively,⁹⁶ for instance, in instigating anti-Yuan activities at various places, and in offering asylum to anti-government extremists.⁹⁷ Japan had resorted to the stratagem of "divide and rule",

The Yunnan insurgency attracted little attention at home or abroad when it began. Militarily, the Anti-Monarchy Army was not strong, but it started a ripple that changed the whole picture in South China, exercising a deep influence on the later development. At first, Yuan ignored the Yunnan forces, because militarily they were insignificant.⁹⁸ He was busy making financial and diplomatic arrangements so that he could devote himself to other more urgent domestic issues, and clear the obstacles to his accession to the throne. Since Britain, on whom Yuan depended for foreign aid, was no longer able to influence Japan against intervening in the monarchial movement, Yuan decided to inch closer to Japan. Yuan proposed to send his Minister of Agriculture and Commerce Chou Tzu-ch'i as special envoy at the enthronement of the Japanese Emperor. He was to bring a medal of the Republic of China to the Mikado.⁹⁹ The Japanese government at first agreed to receive him, then changed its mind.¹⁰⁰ It was rumored that the British Minister (some said the French Minister) was behind the change of mind.¹⁰¹ For all practical purposes, the Japanese move succeeded in killing two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it silenced the Genrō, and on the other, it succeeded in finding out how much Yuan was prepared to pay for the monarchy.¹⁰² At this time, Japan had already set the course for the anti-Yuan policy. The extremists (especially the army) were actively preparing for an anti-Yuan course of action. It was no longer likely that Japan would compromise with the Mo-

narchists. The Chou Tzu-ch'i episode was only a delaying tactic adopted by Japan. From then on, Japan spared no effort in its anti-Yuan activities. The anti-Yuan policy was officially confirmed at the March 7 Cabinet meeting, when it was decided to intervene by force in the monarchical movement. The Japanese government made it clear that Yuan's winning supremacy in China. Japan saw the need to induce the Chinese themselves to rise up against Yuan, while it would make the best use of the opportunity there by presented. Intervention included the following forms : (1) recognition of the Southern Army as a " belligerent power " at an opportune time ; and (2) connivance with Japanese nationals in aiding anti-Yuan activities of the Chinese. ¹⁰³

In fact, since the Yunnan insurgency, the Japanese government, the army, and even private individuals were extensively involved in the anti-Yuan activities. The Cabinet was only giving them official sanction. Of course, this policy decision of the government undoubtedly lent momentum the anti-Yuan activities of the Japanese. It accelerated the downfall of Yuan.

Why did Japan officially express its determination to intervene in Chinese domestic affairs, and by force in Yuan's monarchical movement ? The main reasons were : the popular demand of " go tough on China " advocates among the private individuals, and the maneuverings of the extremists inside the government. ¹⁰⁴ Since the end of 1915, the public opinion in Japan had been vehemently anti-Yuan. ¹⁰⁵ In January 1916, the " Alliance of People's Diplomacy " (Kokumin Gaikō Dōmeikai), sponsored by Uchida Ryōhei, Ogawa Heikichi and others, appealed to the Japanese public to oppose Yuan. ¹⁰⁶ The most radical of them all was the " Congress of People Interested in China ", convened in Tokyo. The Congress was organized by parliamentarians of the Seiyū Kai, Dōshi Kai, and Chūsei Kai, Alliance of People's Diplomacy, Taishi Dengōkai (Union of organizations interested in Chinese Questions) and Rō-

nin groups. Not a few entrepreneurs and members of the press also attended the Congress, attracting considerable attention.

The Congress denounced Yuan in a unanimous resolution.¹⁰⁷

The civilian agitators enjoyed support from the extremists inside the Japanese government. In January, Koike Chōzō, head of the political affairs division of the Gaimushō (Japanese Foreign Office), invited the army to discuss measures to put anti-Yuan policy into practice. General Tanaka Giichi, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was the most zealous.¹⁰⁸ The change in the Japanese attitude from wait-and-see to active intervention can be seen in Tanaka's instruction to Sakanishi Rihachirō not long after Japan had rejected Yuan's special envoy.¹⁰⁹ From this time on, the initiative in Japan's China policy shifted to the army. As the militarists gained ascendancy, Japan entered a period of imperialistic diplomacy.

Now that Japan had decided on an anti-Yuan policy, it proceeded with activities in (1) Manchuria and Mongolia; (2) Shantung; and (3) South China (including Shanghai). However, the "Second Manchuria-Mongolia Independence Movement"¹¹⁰, the "Doi Plan" did not proceed well because the army, Rōnin, and the Japanese diplomatic representatives were divided among themselves.¹¹¹

The political situation in Manchuria changed as Yuan's monarchical movement hit a snag. After Chang Tso-lin gained control of Manchuria in April 1916, Japan tried to "win over Chang". But the situation underwent another change following the sudden death of Yuan.¹¹² In Shantung, the Japanese (mainly the Japanese garrison troops in Tsingtao) supported the attack by the "Revolutionary Army" on Wei Hsien and other places in May. Though the attack shook the Northern Army, it was not able to reverse the situation.¹¹³ However, Manchuria and Shantung were

to remain in an agitated state even after the death of Yuan, but

the anti-Yuan activities in these two places , remained no more than an agitation. They did not constitute too much of a threat. The most crucial role of all was played by the anti-Yuan camp in South China. After the March 7 Cabinet meeting , Japan spared no efforts in its aid to anti-Yuan activities in South China , such as the supply of weapons , money , dispatch of military and legislative advisers , coordination among various South China leaders , agitation in various parts of China , etc. The Japanese stopped at nothing and resorted to every trick in the book. ¹¹⁴ However , the recognition of Southern Army as a " belligerent power " did not materialize. ¹¹⁵ Under all out support of Japan , several provinces in South China declared independence one after another , compelling Yuan to abrogate the throne in late March. ¹¹⁶ But Japan continued to press hard. After Yuan failed in his bid to sue for peace with the South , he tried to make the largest possible concessions to Japan by accepting the terms of Ōkura Kihachirō (negotiations on No. 5 in the Twentyone Demands) . Japan rejected even that offer. ¹¹⁷ On April 17 , Baron Ishii told Chinese Minister Lu Tsung-yü that the Japanese Government was prepared to offer Yuan and his family protection and privilege if Yuan chose to come to Japan after retirement , that was not only an insultant but an intimidation to a sovereign. ¹¹⁸

Japan remained ardent in its " aid the Southern Army " activities. ¹¹⁹ It resorted to financial means (refusing to pay " salt tax " arrears) to strangle the Peking government. ¹²⁰ By late May , when the " Nanking Conference " , proposed by Feng Kuo-chang , who was regarded as Yuan's most trusted lieutenant , failed , the fate of the monarchy was sealed. ¹²¹ Yuan died in early June , a man shaken and broken. The Japanese intervention in the monarchical movement ended with the death of Yuan. Japan then turned to support Vice President Li Yuan-hung. ¹²² The pro-

blem of China , however , showed all signs of further chaos.

Conclusion

Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchical movement was the product of circumstances obtaining at home in China and abroad at that time. The real mainspring of the movement , however , was the ambitions of Yuan himself. The circumstances were no longer conducive to monarchy. That was clear from the public support of the anti-Yuan forces. In foreign relations , China was then under the influence of various Powers who maintained a delicate balance of power vis-a-vis China. At home , the Yuan regime resorted to high-handed rule , while in its relations with the Powers, it had no alternative but to rely on imperialist Powers. China had all the signs of semi-colony. Since the 1911 Revolution , the Yuan regime had relied exclusively on Britain. It allied with Britain to resist Japanese pressure. The most successful result of this policy was the " Great Reorganization Loan " and the victory of the Second Revolution. But this dependence on Britain became impossible after the outbreak of the war in Europe. Japan replaced Britain as the most influential power in China. It was anxious to expand its influence and interest in China. Even the Twenty-one Demands did not completely satisfy Japan's ambitions. All echelons in Japan considered Yuan to be the main obstacle to its expansionist policy in China. Japan wanted to get rid of him. The advocates of " March South " policy in Japan wanted more concessions in South China. They wanted to support the Revolutionaries in their opposition to Yuan , while the advocates of " March North " policy wanted an independent Manchuria and

Mongolia. They too wanted to get rid of Yuan.

Yuan's accession to the throne offered Japan the most sought-after excuse for intervention. So Japan first goaded Yuan on with promises and baits. Then it instigated the anti-Yuan movements in all over China. Japan resorted to every possible means to bring down Yuan regime.

Japan's intervention in the monarchical movement helped spread the anti-Yuan movement, bringing to a climax the confrontation between North and South, hastening Yuan's downfall. Even though the Japanese did not reap any real benefit at the time. Their activities created a pattern of intervention in China's domestic affairs in later years. Within China, the sudden death of Yuan, who was by far the greatest warlord in the Northern Army, brought about division within its ranks. The biggest warlord had fallen. Following Yuan's death, a number of lesser warlords appeared to aggravate the chaos. Seen from this point of view, it is clear that Japan did not succeed in its China policy. It only aggravated the Chinese domestic problems.

Abbreviations Used in the Notes

- CCS Li Chien-nung 李劍農, *Chung-kuo chin pai-nien cheng-chih shih* 中國近百年政治史 (A Political History of Modern China, 1840-1928; Taipei, 1957) Vol. II.
- CWS Chang Chung-fu 張忠絳, *Chung-hua-min-kuo wai-chiao shih* 中華民國外交史 (A Diplomatic History of the Republic of China; Taipei, 1957) Vol. I.
- USFR *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.*
- GBCP Great Britain, Foreign Office, *China, Confidential Print*, 1857-1937 (F. O. 405).

- Jafa Japan, *Archives in Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 1868-1945.
- KMWH Kuomintang Archives, ed., *Ko-ming wen-hsien* 革命文獻 (Documents on Revolution ; Taipei, 1953-1961)
- CJ Wang Yun-sheng 王芸生, comp., *Liu-shih-nien lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen* 六十年來中國與日本 (China and Japan During the Last Sixty Years ; Tientsin, 1932). Vol. VII.
- LNP Ts'en Hsueh-llü 岑學呂 *San-shui Liang Yen-san hsiensheng nien-p'u* 三水梁燕孫先生年譜 (A Chronological Biography of Liang Shih-i ; Fengkang, 1939) Vol. I.
- NGB Japanese Foreign Ministry, *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*.
- PTS T'ao Chü-yin 陶菊隱 *Pei-yang Chün-fa t'ung-chih shih-ch'i shih-hua* 北洋軍閥統治時期史話 (History of the Period Under Northern Warlords; Peking, 1957).
- TSSK Kuzi Yoshihisa, *Tōa senkaku shishi kiden* (Stories and Biographies of Pioneer East Asian Adventurers ; Tokyo, 1935-1938) Vol. II.
- YCM Pai Chiao 白蕉 *Yuan Shih-k'ai yü chung-hua-min-kuo* 袁世凱與中華民國 (Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Republic of China ; Shanghai, 1936).

Notes

1. CCS, P. 412.
2. CCS, p. 400.
3. Shih Pao 時報 (The Times) June 27, Nov. 10, 1912 ; Somura Yasunobu, *Kindai-shi kenkyu* (A Study of Modern History, Japan and China ; Tokyo, 1962) p. 100 ; YCM, pp. 8-9.
4. CCS, pp. 372-380.
5. CWS, pp. 60-69 ; YCM, pp. 48-49 ; Cyril Pearl, *Morrison of Peking* (Sydney, 1967), p. 249.
6. Jerome Ch'en, *Yuan Shih-k'ai*, 1895-1916 (Stanford, 1961), p. 255.
7. CCS, p. 415.
8. Chang Nai-han 章乃涵 described Yuan as " a president with imperial powers and prerogatives " see Chang, *Hsin-hai ko-*

- ming yü Yuan Shih-k'ai* 辛亥革命與袁世凱 (The 1911 Revolution and Yuan Shih-k'ai ; Peking , 1949) pp. 56-114 ; Yang Yu-chiung 楊幼炯 *Chung-kuo chin-tai li-fa shih* 中國近代立法史 (A Legislative History of Modern China ; Shanghai , 1936) , pp. 154-209.
9. CCS , p. 418 ; NGB , 1915 , II , 1-2.
10. Kikuchi Takaharu , *Chūgoku minzoku no kihon kōzō* (The Historical Background of the Chinese National Movement ; Tokyo , 1966) pp. 163-170 ; NGB , 1915 II , pp. 635-960.
11. (Cyril) Pearl , p. 311.
12. YCM , pp. 162-174 ; NGB , 1915 , II (No. 23) ; USFR , 1915 pp. 53-58 (No. 747 Enclosure).
13. Ts'ao Ju-lin 曹汝霖 *T'sao Ju-lin I-sheng chih hui i* 曹汝霖一生之回憶 (Memoirs of Ts'ao Ju-lin ; Taipei , 1970) , p. 104 ; B. L. Putnum Weale , *The Fight for the Republic in China* (New York , 1917) , p. 354.
14. CCS , pp. 421-424 ; Weale , pp. 113-127 ; Peking Daily News , Aug. 20 , 1915.
15. Huang I 黃毅 *Yuan-shih tao-kuo-chi* 袁氏盜國記 (How Yuan Shih-k'ai Usurped the Powers ; Taipei , 1962) , pp. 59-66 ; Sun Yao 孫曜 *Chung-hua-min-kuo shih-liao* 中華民國史料 (Documents of the Republic of China ; Taipei , reprint) , pp. 322-327 ; LNP , pp. 279-280.
16. Liu Cheng-yü 劉成禺 *Hung-hsien chi-shu n-shih pen-shih pu chu* 洪憲記事詩本事簿注 (Annotated Poems on the Events During Yuan Shih-k'ai's Monarchical movement ; Taipei , 1961) , p. 18.
17. Hioki to Ōkuma , Aug. 12 , 1915 (Jafa : secret No. 256).
18. PRS , II , 101.
19. Chang I-lin 張一麐 *Wu-shi h-nien lai kuo-shih ts'ung-t'an* 五十年來國事叢談 (Remembrances of National Events in the Last Fifty Years) in *Hsin-tai-p'ing-shih chi* 心太平室集 (Collected Papers of Chang I-lin ; Taipei , reprint) I. 26.
20. YCM , pp. 149-150 ; CCS , p. 418 ; Kao Lao 高勞 *Ti-chih yün-tung shih-mo chi* 帝制運動始末記 (An Account of the Monarchical Movement ; Taipei , reprint) , p. 77.
21. CCS , p. 418 ; NGB , 1915 II. 16 (Secret , No. 73).

22. Among Yuan's lieutenants , Ni Ssu-ch'ung and others were the most enthusiastic ; Chang Hsün also showed interest. See YCM pp. 18-19 ; Shih Pao , Jan . 23 , 1912 ; Chang I-lin , p. 26.
23. CCS , pp. 418-419 ; Aida Tsutomu , *Kawashima Naniwa Ō* (A Biography of Kawashima Naniwa , Tokyo , 1936) , p. 114.
24. Three vice ministers were Vice Minister of the Army Hsü Shu-cheng , Vice Minister of Finance Chang Hu and Vice Minister of Communications Yeh Kung-chō . Five Railways case referred to charges of corruption against officials of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and four other railways. For details , see LNP , p. 267.
25. La Fargue , T. E. *China and the World War* (Stanford , 1936 1936) , pp. 79-80.
26. P'eng Tse-chou 彭澤周 *Hsin-hai ko-ming yü Jih-pen Hsiyuansh-ih nei-ko* 辛亥革命與日本西園寺內閣 (The 1911 Revolution and Japan's Saionji Cabinet) in *Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih ts'ung-k'an* 中國現代史叢刊 (Anthologies of Contemporary Chinese History ; Taipei , 1961) VI , 139 ; J. O. P. Bland , *Recent Events and Present Policies in China* (London , 1912) , p. 283 ; The Times , Nov. 14 , 1911.
27. Jerome Ch'en , p. 217.
28. Somura , pp. 120-121.
29. CWS , p. 175.
30. For the 1911 Revolution , see P'eng , pp. 19-24 ; for the Second Revolution , see Fujiwara Akira , *Daiichiji taisen chokuzen no nihon gunbu* (The Military Circles of Japan before World War I. (1)) , in *Rekishigaku Kenkyu* (April , 1972) , No. 383.
31. NGB 1914 , III , 590-595 (Unnumbered ; Top Secret).
32. Ōtsu Junichirō , *Dainihon Kenseishi* (A Constitutional History of Japan ; Tokyo , 1927-1928) VII , 493-496.
33. Horikawa Takeo , , *Kyokutō kokusai sei ji shi josetsu* (An Introduction to International Political History of the Far East ; Tokyo , 1958) , p. 28 ; Obata Torikichi denki kankōkai , ed . , *Obata Torikichi* (A Biography of Obata Torikichi ; Tokyo , 1957) , p. 91.

34. Yu Hui-yuan 游晦原 *Chung-kuo tsai-tsz shih* 中國再造史
(A History of China Re-Built ; Taipei) , p.1 ; Chü Cheng 居
正 *Chü Chieh-sheng hsien-sheng chuan-chi* 居覺生全集
(Collected Papers of Chü Cheng ; Taipei , 1954) , I. , 241-249.
35. CJ , VII , pp. 1-3.
36. CWS , pp. 180-181 ; Kitamura Hironao, *Yume no shichijū yonen*
(A Biography of Nishihara Kamezō ; Tokyo , 1971) , p.64.
37. CCS , pp. 420-421.
38. Shun-t'ien shih-pao 順天時報 (The Shun-t'ien Times) , Jan.
28 , 29 , 1915 ; CCS , p. 420 ; NGB , 1915 , II , 4-12 (
No. 228 , secret, ,, No. 263) ; Hioki to Katō , July 23 , 1915
(Jafa) .
39. NGB , 1915 , II ,16-23 , secret No. 73) .
40. NGB , 1915 , II , 36 (NO. 53) ; Yoshimi Masanobu , ed. ,
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Tokyo , 1933) . pp. 503-506 . By Sakanishi's own accounts ,
„ See Weale , pp. 35-36 ; see also Obata , pp. 168-169 ;
Liu , p. 47.
41. Sekiya Mitsuo , *Kaiketsu Yen Sei-gai* (Yuan Shih-k'ai , the
Wonder Man ; Tokyo , 1913) , preface.
42. NGB 1915 , II , 46-48 (NO. 310) , 76-78 (No. 267) ;
Jordan to Langley , Sept. 23 , 1915 (GBCP) .
43. Jordan to Langley , Sept. 23 , 1915 ; Green to Grey , Oct. 13
, 1915 (GBCP) .
44. Jordan to Grey, Oct. 11 , 1915 (GBCP : No. 251) ; GBN,
1915 , II , 74 (No. 456) ; LNP , p. 295.
45. Pearl , pp. 310-311.
46. NGB , 1915 , II , 28 (No. 520) .
47. Somura , p. 111.
48. CJ. VII .4 .
49. Lin Ming-te , *A Study of Japan's Diplomatic Policy on China* ,
1911-1915 „ Bulletin of the institute of Modern History, Aca-
demia Sinica , IV , Part II , (Taipei , 1974) pp. 447-455.
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Sept. 9 , 1915 ; Diplomatic Archives : " Telegrams on Japan
" , Academia Sinica.

51. CJ , VII , 6 ; NGB, 1915 , II 61 , 63-65 (secret No. 73 , No. 100 , No. 962 , No. 174 , No. 54) ; TSSR , II , 594-595.
52. NGB , 1915 , II , 28 (No. 520) 57-58 (No. 110) .
53. NGB , 1915 , II , 61 (No. 62) , 63-65 (No. 174 , No. 150 , No. 100) ; Hioki to Ōkuma , Aug. 12 , 1915 (JAFA : secret No. 256.
54. NGB , 1915 , II , 60-61 (NO. 255) .
55. Regarding this , See Lin Ming-te *Yuan Shih-k'ai yü Ch'ao-hsien* 袁世凱與朝鮮 (Yuan Shih-K'ai and Korea,, Taipei , 1970) , pp 359.
56. Pearl , p. 311 , Shu Chiung , 叔綱 *Min ssu t'iao -yüeh chih shang-tsu-chuan wen t'i* 民四條約之商租權問題 (On the Question of lease under the 1915 Treaty) ; *Wai-chiao yüeh-pao* 外交月報 (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) , 1.5 , Oct. 1932 ; Mansyūshi kenkyukai , ed. *Nihon teikoku Shugika no Mansyū* (Manchuria under Japanese Imperialism ; Tokyo , 1972) , pp. 325-330 ; Ts'ao , p. 101.
57. For details on controversy between " March North": and " March South " advocates in Japan , See Somura Yasunobu , *Taishō de-mocracy no gaikyōron teki haikei* (Diplomatic Background for Tai-shō Democracy) , in *Tōyō bunka kenkyu sho kiyō* (The Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture) No. 37.
58. Ōkuma kō hachijūgō nen shi hensankai , ed. , *Ōkuma kō hachi jū nen shi* (A Biography of Count Ōkuma Shigenobu ; Tokyo , 1926) III , 335-338.
59. Ōtsu , VII , 679-683 ; TSSK , II , 591-593.
60. Somura , pp. 115-116.
61. TSSK , II , 591-592.
62. NGB , 1915 , II , 68-69 (No. 550 (; Chang Wei-han 張維翰 *Min-ch'u wen-hsien i-shu* 民初文獻一東 (Collected Papers on Early Republican Period ; Taipei , 1968) , pp. 111-127 ; LNP , pp. 295-297 ; Ts'ao , p. 118.
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64. Tokyo Asahi shinbun sei-ji-bu , ed. , *Sonokoro o kataru* (Recollections , Tokyo , 1928) , pp. 351-352 ; Hara Keiichirō , *Hara Kei nikki* (The Diary of Hara Kei ; Tokyo , 1967) , IV, pp.140-141 ; Ishii Kikujirō , *Gaikō Yoroku* (Notes on Diplomacy ; Tokyo , 19-1930) , pp. 111-112.

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67. NGB , 1915 , II , 97-100 (No. 588) ; Obata , pp. 169-170 ; CJ , VII , 10 ; Jordan to Grey , Oct. 28 , 1915 (GBCP : No. 272).
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70. CJ , VII , 7-9.
71. Ibid , pp. 11-14 ; Jordan to Grey , Oct. 38 , 1915 (GBCP : No. 270).
72. GNB , 1915 , II , 116 (No. 612) .
73. CJ , VI , 20 ; NGB , 1915 , II , 127-128 (No. 626 , No. 628).
74. CCS , pp. 425-429 ; KMWH , VI , pp. 116-117 ; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao , 梁啓超 *Yin-ping-shih chuan-chi* 飲冰室專集 (Collected Papers of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao ; Shanghai , 1941) XXXIII , pp. 112 ; Reinsch , P. S. , *An American Diplomat in China* (London , 1922) p. 179 ; Oka to Ishii , Nov. 1 , 1915 (Jafa : No. 14).
75. La Fargue , P. 38 ; Gaimushō hiakunen shi hensan iinkai , *Gaimushō no hiakunen* (One Hundred Years of Ministry of Foreign Affairs ; Tokyo , 1969) , I , 620 ; GGB , 1915 , III , 919-925 (No. 547 , No. 656 , No. 657 , No. 548 , No. 551) ; Reinsch , p. 179.
76. NGB , 1915 , III , 92-93 (No. 998) ; Somura , pp. 120-121.
77. Somura , p. 121 ; Reinsch , p. 179.
78. NGB , 1915 , III , 938-940 (Top secret).
79. Somura , P. 124.
80. NGB , 1915 , III , pp. 957-958 (No. 648 , No. 659 , No. 524).

81. Ibid , pp. 963-966 (NO. 353 , No ,562 , No, 530).
82. Somura , p. 124.
83. NGB , 1915 , III , 972-981 (No . 604 , No. 608 , No. 1168 , No. 685).
84. LNP , pp. 290-291 ; Pearl , pp. 315-316.
85. CWS , p. 207 ; Weale , pp. 310-311 ; Williams E. T. , *A short History of China* (New York and London , 1928) , p. 515.
86. CWS , p. 206 ; CJ , VII , 26 ; Pearl , p. 316.
87. NGB , 1915 , II , 170-171 (No. 695) ; CJ , p. 24.
88. CJ , VII , 24.
89. The so-called " Shanghai Incident " referred to an attempt to seize a gunboat , the Chao Ho , organized by Ch'en Ch'i-mei , a member of the Revolutionary Party , and his followers , See Kitamura , p. 72 ; TSSK , II, 598-644 ; NGB , 1915 , II, 211-213 (NO. 276 , No. 143) ; Jansen , p.195.
90. CCS , pp. 430-432 ; Inaba Iwakichi , *Shina teisei ron* (Monarchical System in China ; Tokyo , 1916) , p. 199.
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92. CCS , pp. 437-438 .
93. Terahiro Teruo , *Goko kugun ni tsuite* (On Anti-Monarchy Army) , in *Tōyōshi Kenkyū* 17 - 3 .
94. CCS , pp. 443-445 ; Liang , XXXIII , 121-126 ; Ting Wen-chiang 丁文江 *Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p' u ch' ang-pien ch' u-kao* 梁任公先生年譜長編初稿 (First Draft of a Chronological Biography of Liang Ch'i -ch'ao ; Taipei , 1958) , II , 468.
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96. CCS , pp. 437-438 ; NGB , 1916 , II , 97-99 (No. 123 , secret

- No. 981) ; Imai to Ishii , Mar. 12 , 1916 (Jafa : Top secret No. 52) ; USFR (1915) , pp. 61-62 (No. 766).
97. NGB , 1916 , II , 93-94 (No. 29) ; Shimizu to Ishii , Jan. 28 , 30 , 1916 (Jafa : No. 2 , No. 5).
 98. NGB , 1916 , II , 32-33 (No. 145).
 99. NGB 1915 , II , 202 (No. 755) ; NGB , 1916 , II , 9-8 (No. 43 , No. 14 , No. 15) ; CJ , VII , 29-32 ; Weale , P. 256 ; Reinsch , pp. 184-185 ; PTS , II , 142.
 100. NGB , 1916 , II , 7-9 (No. 14 , 15 , 18 , 48).
 101. Chang I-lin , p. 25 ; Ts'ao , p. 119 ; LNP , pp. 297-298.
 102. CJ , VII , 33-35.
 103. NGB , 1916 , II , 45-46 ; Japan Foreign Ministry , *Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabi ni shuyō bunsho* (A Chronological Table and Main Documents of Japanese Diplomacy ; Tokyo , 1955) , I , 415-419.
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 105. Obata et al. to Ishii , Nov. 3 , 1915 (Jafa) ; Somura , p. 140.
 106. Memoranda of Uchida Ryōhei et al. , Jan. 16 , 1916 (Jafa : No. 59) ; Kokuryū Club , *Kokushi Uchida Ryōhei den* (A Biography of Uchida Ryōhei ; Tokyo , 1967) , p. 556.
 107. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun , Feb. 27 , 1916 .
 108. Gaimushō , I , 640-641 ; *Hara Kei nikki* , II , 161 ; Somura , p. 172 , Kitamura , p. 72.
 109. NGB , 1916 , II , 22 (Unnumbered ; top secret).
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 111. The Doi Plan was promoted by colonel Doi with the blessing of the General Staff under which a group of reserve officers and Rōnin would organize some 1500 Chinese bandits for a rioting. For details see Takakura Tetsuichi , *Tanaka Giichi denki* (A Biography of Tanaka Giichi , Tokyo , 1958) , p. 651 ; Kurihara , pp. 148-149.
 112. Kurihara , pp. 150-152.

113. Kitamura , p. 102 ; TSSK , II , 612-620 ; Chü Cheng , p. 340 ; USFR , 1916 , pp. 79-80 ; Kayano Chōchi , *Chūka minko ku kakumei hi kyū* (Private sources for the Chinese Revolution ; Tokyo , 1940) , II , 354-356 ; Jansen , p. 195.
114. " A File on China's Monarchical Movement " , Mar. 1915-1916 (JAFA , passim).
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116. CCS , pp. 450-455 ; Sun , pp. 337-339.
117. Foreign Ministry to Lu Tsung-yü , Apr . 7 , 1916 (Diplomatic Archives ; Incoming and Outgoing Telegrams).
118. NGB , 1916 , II , 62-63 (No. 67).
119. Imai to Ishii , May 22 , 1916 (JAFA : No. 189).
120. NGB , 1916 , II , 75-77 (No. 473) ; USFR , 1916 , p. 76 (No. 1031).
121. PTS, II, pp. 212-220 ; CCS, pp. 462-463.
122. NGB , 1916 , II , 56-57 , 62-63 (No. 111 , No. 27 , No. 23 , No. 133) ; USFR , 1916 , p. 82 (No. 1081).