

**PROBLEMS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS ACHIEVEMENTS
DURING THE "GOLDEN DECADE"**

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I. FOREWORD

The ten years between the accomplishment of the Northern Expedition in June 1928 and the breakout of the second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 was called the "Golden Decade" in modern Chinese history. It was also the first time for the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) actually controlled national political power and implemented its ideals to build up a modern nation.

During this period, the National Government faced various difficulties politically or diplomatically, economically or financially, militarily or national defense-wise. However, the government eventually overcame all these difficulties one by one with every possible efforts and gradually accomplished its preliminary ideals of building up a modern nation, thus stored sizable national strength for the forthcoming eight-year Sino-Japanese War. This performance was unprecedented in the history of China.

Based on some materials and studies published in the past few years, this article is to review this period of history and evaluate the difficulties the National Government encountered and the success it might have achieved at that time. The discussion is limited to only military and administrative aspects in order to have a deeper insight because of limited space and since historians had studied achievements of China in the fields of economy, finance, transportation and society brilliantly during this decade.

Furthermore, in my opinion, economic, financial, transportational and

social achievements obtained by the Chinese government during this period were mainly based on the success of military and administrative reforms. It is somewhat defective without touching administrative and military aspects, and I hope this article could bear on some points neglected by other scholars.

II. EXTERNAL DIFFICULTIES—JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN INVASIONS

The greatest difficulties from outside China had been facing during its early years were the Japanese imperialist invasion and various subversive activities attempted by the Soviet Union.

Japan did not disguise its invasion with the policy of supporting China's "open doors" after winning the Russo-Japanese War and started its fierce armed attacks and robberies. Not only Manchuria became its domain, but also all rights it obtained from Germany by declaring war against Germany in the name of Anglo-Japanese Alliance during the First World War. Japan gradually controlled Manchuria, Mongolia and North China in the pretext of supporting ambitious Yüan Shih-k'ai to assume his post as Emperor of China and took the opportunity to present the so-called "Twenty-one Demands."

During the disordered period of the militant warlords, Japan first positively supported Tuan Ch'i-jui, attempting to control the Peking Government and then completely control the political situation of China. After Tuan failed, Japan tightened its control on Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, supported Chang Tsung-chang in Shantung and Sun Chuang-fan who was defeated in Kiangsu and Chekiang. Therefore, when the National Revolutionary Army advanced toward Shantung during its Northern Expedition, the Japanese Cabinet headed by Tanaka Giichi implemented its "scorpion-type policy" in one hand, planning to capture the whole Manchuria and North China using Shantung and Liaotung peninsulas as its nippers¹ and presented the so-called "Tanaka Memorial," formulating its measures to swallow the whole China and then conquer the world.

The Japanese also dispatched reinforcements to Shantung in the pretext of protecting its overseas residents, stopped the National Revolutionary Army from advancing northward, provoked the "May Third Tsinan Incident," held Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Fu², shot and killed Diplomatic Correspondent Tsai Kung-shih and 15 other diplomats³, and attempted to kidnap Commanding General Chiang Kai-shek of the Northern Expedition Army⁴ in order to totally disrupt the Northern Expedition mission of the National Government at one

stroke.

As the Revolutionary Army, bearing the insult, turned around and advanced toward Peking and Tientsin by crossing the Yellow River to carry on its mission, Japan then forced Chang Tso-lin to concede the rights on five railways in Manchuria and Mongolia by signing a secret treaty⁵. At the time the Japanese Kantō Army had issued a mobilization order, concentrated its troops in Fengtien, dispatched reinforcements to Chintsou, attempting to disarm the Fengtien Army that was retreating toward Northeast China and to stop by force the National Revolutionary Army from entering Manchuria.

Finally, Chang Tso-lin, head of the Fengtien Army, was killed at Huangkutuen on June 4, 1928, in an explosion plotted by the Japanese.⁶ This had prompted Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso-lin, to return to the fold of the National Government.

After the completion of the Northern Expedition, Japan not only made all the troubles during the negotiations for China to restore its customs sovereignty, threatened the National Government to recognize the "Nishihara loans" and asked for customs revenues as guarantee for repayments, but also delayed its recognition of the National Government until June 3, 1929. It also reacted coldly to Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's assuming his post as President of the National Government by sending only its Consul-general Okamoto Isaku in Nanking to convey verbal congratulations to the Foreign Ministry of China.

In July 1929, the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria with large force. Japan also waited for its turn, not only refusing the invitation of the United States to mediate jointly the Sino-Russian War but also reinforcing its troops in Changtsun, conducting military exercises and refusing the crossing of South Manchurian Railway by the Chinese army.⁷

The Civil War in 1930 broke out in the next year. Japan again threatened Chang Hsueh-liang to collaborate with Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yü-hsiang and other war-lords and to assume his post as Committee member of the puppet "National Government" in the North.⁸

Meanwhile, high staff officer Itagaki Seishiro and chief staff office, Ishihara Kanji of the Japanese Kanto Army formulated their plan to conquer the whole Manchuria—"Study on the Occupation and Rule of Manchuria and Mongolia," plotting to merge Manchuria in three phases: 1) Occupation phase, destroying Chinese political and economic systems in Manchuria; 2) Ruling phase, allowing the Koreans to operate all paddy-fields and the Chinese for small businesses only; and 3) National defense phase, shouldering occupation expenses with revenues in

Manchuria in the form of self-sufficiency.⁹

As Chang Hsueh-liang planned to put foreign affairs, transportation and finance of Manchuria under the jurisdiction of the National Government, the Foreign Ministry of the Japanese government also formulated its "Secret Plan to Destroy Manchuria and Mongolia," determining to strengthen the Chinese government on the surface by designating Chang Hsueh-liang as the one in charge of Manchuria's foreign affairs. They planned to stop the Fengtien authorities from constructing railroad networks with all-out efforts, adopted the policy of achieving peace by threatening to wage war in order to maintain permanently the prosperity of South Manchurian Railway and the harbor of Dairen, and waited for the right opportunity to achieve its ultimate goal of occupying Manchuria and Mongolia¹⁰.

In May 1931, Itagaki Seishiro again presented the so-called "The Handling of Manchurian and Mongolian Issues Formula", including: 1) the independence of Mongolia; 2) the independence of Tsientao; and 3) the harassment of Northern Manchuria. Japanese harassed North Manchuria in order to fanning large-scale anti-Japanese movement in the Northeast and using it as an excuse for the Kantō Army to occupy the region by force.¹¹

Japan became more active in its attempt to occupy Manchuria when the presidency of South Manchurian Railway was taken over by Uchida Yasuya, who had been propagating for immediate aggression on China, in June that year.

The Japanese police headquarters in Dairen organized eight squads of secret agent police to engage in reconnaissance and espionage activities. Military barracks were constructed along the South Manchurian Railway by the Japanese in the name of building warehouses while fortifications were also constructed in neighboring the Railway in Mukden.¹²

At this point, the Kantō Army entered into mobilization stage and prepared for war. Thus the Japanese army launched the "September 18 Mukden Incident" after the Wanpaoshan and Nakamura Incidents and occupied the whole Manchuria. The following year, they provoked the January 28 Incident in Shanghai, attempting to destroy the Chinese anti-Japanese military force in one stroke.

Then the Japanese advanced to and occupied Jehol, where they attacked and took over Shanhai Pass, they also attacked the Chinese troops based along the east portion of the Great Wall, and gradually invaded the areas south of the Great Wall. Itagaki Seishiro snuck into North China and plotted internal strife in his capacity as chief of secret agent organization in Tientsin, in an attempt to set up a puppet anti-National Government regime in North China just as Japan did in Manchuria.¹³ He then incited the former troops of Shih You-san to declare independence in

Luanchou and created various incidents as excuses for the Japanese army to be sent to and stationed in Peking. Finally, he forced China to sign a truce agreement with Japan and withdrew the Chinese troops to the west and south of Yenching, Tungchou and Lutai, under the provision that China only keep police force in maintaining peace and order in the whole eastern Hopei, but not station troops. Therefore, Peking and Tientsin also fell into the hands of the Japanese army because of its becoming a non-defense zone.

The greatest difference between the Japanese invasion at this time and those of other foreign powers was not only its unscrupulous military violence but also its hateful acts of inhuman and cold-blooded torture on Chinese officials and civilians. The Japanese committed countless rapes, arsons, rapines and disgraced Chinese diplomats as well. This was best demonstrated by the facts that they held Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Fu in custody during the May Third Tsinan Incident, forcing him to sign a document confessing that the Chinese army should be blamed for the Tsinan conflict, and ordered Diplomatic Correspondent Tsai Kung-shih to kneel down in public where he was shot to death.

Therefore Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary:

“How could we forget this kind of humiliation if we have a little bit of heart! Only by self-strengthening can we eradicate it. It is only foolhardiness if we are determined to wipe out this shame but can not tolerate it for the moment, and we definitely can not accomplish the mission to eradicate the humiliation this way. I will now temporarily tolerate what ordinary people can not do!¹⁴”

“I set my daily homework—to get up at six o’clock every day from now on and commemorate the national shame without intermittence, until the national shame is wiped out.¹⁵”

Another external difficulty encountered by the National Government was the Soviet Union’s aiding the Chinese Communist Party in efforts to divide the Kuomintang and in their other activities to communize China. Chiang Kai-shek recognized the fundamental conflict between the Russian political system and political system of the Chinese Nationalist Party as early as 1923 when he visited and observed the Soviet Union. He therefore had firm determination to fight against communism all his life. During the time he was in charge of the Hwampoa Military Academy and the Northern Expedition, he tried his best to prevent Russian advisers from grasping power and aiding the Chinese Communists in their plot to divide and infiltrate the Kuomintang. Russian adviser Borodin and the Chinese Communists also treated Chiang Kai-shek as their arch rival and branded him as a new rightist. Their divisive policy against the Nationalist Party was: to unite

with the leftists, to force the neutrals to attack the reactionary rightists, and to prevent the neutrals from developing and force them to deviate from right to left. Thus there was the movement to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and eventually split the Nanking and Wuhan factions as the Northern Expedition was militarily being conducted smoothly.

But after the Nanking Incident, the provocation of Communist Nanchang Riot on April 2, the search of Russian embassy in Peking and the aborted plot to overthrow the Wang Ching-wei regime in Wuhan, the Kuomintang completely broke away from the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party. Both Nanking and Wuhan authorities started to purge the Communists from the Kuomintang and ended the policy "to unite with the Soviet Union and accept the Communists." The Chinese Communists formally and openly tried to seize political powers by force. Thus attacking the communists also became an extremely important measure in suppressing inner subversions during the "Golden Decade."

The Chinese Communists started rioting in Canton at the end of that year. Personnel of the Russian consulates and the Third International who participated in the riot were arrested by the National Revolutionary Army and the National Government formally severed its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and closed down all Russian consulates in the country¹⁶.

From then on, since Manchuria returned to the fold of the National Government, the Soviet Union attempted to assassinate important anti-communist leaders in Nanking, and other big cities. They tightened their control over the Chinese Eastern Railway to use it as the base for relaying messages and financing the communists as well as other subversive groups. Then they attempted to incite Feng Yü-hsiang to create large-scale chaos in North China¹⁷.

In February 1929, Chang Hsueh-liang tried to limit the Russians' power on the Chinese Eastern Railway through negotiations but the Russians ignored him. In May Chang sent police to ambush the Russian Consulate-general in Harbin when informed of a meeting being convened there by the Communist International to plot subversive activities. More than 30 important Russian personnel were arrested and various confidential documents pertaining to incitation of subversion, the overthrow of government and the communization of the Chinese Eastern Railway were seized. The Chinese government thus determined to retrieve the telecommunications right over the Chinese Eastern Railway¹⁸. However, the Russian government sent large forces separately from Manchouli, Suifenho, the converging point of Sungari and Amur Rivers to invade Manchuria. They also refused to accept mediation by the United States, the United Kingdom, France

and Germany.

Negotiated by the Northeast representative Ts'ai Yun-sheng, the Government was forced to sign the Poli Agreement with the Soviet agent because the Chinese Communists staged riots in Kwangtung and Feng Yü-hsiang, Lee Tsung-jen and Chang Fa-k'uei rebelled almost at the same time. In the agreement, the Russians held China responsible for the incident and took the opportunity to restore its rights over the Chinese Eastern Railway to the previous arrangements¹⁹. The National Government could not agree to the conditions and sent Mo Te-huei to Moscow for negotiations. After more than one year, the negotiations ended in vain because the September 18 Mukden Incident occurred and Manchuria fell into the hands of the Japanese. Later the Soviet Union unilaterally sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to the puppet Manchukuo.

As the Russian troops invaded Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek had cabled all those concerned throughout the country to fight against the intruders to the end because he thought it was a crucial life and death situation for the nation and that the success or failure of the national revolution depended on it. But because of internal strife and Japan's invasions, China was forced to suffer humiliation and had no choice but to try and settle the issue again through negotiations.

III. INTERNAL TROUBLES—LOCAL MILITARY FACTIONS AND COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

The National Revolutionary Army succeeded rapidly in accomplishing the Northern Expedition not only because of its belief in San Min Chu I, its high morale, its well trained strict, and rigid discipline, but also because of its successful application of political strategies to divide the enemies and make them surrender. Also because of this, few military leaders were still in control of areas when the Northern warlords lost in the Northern Expedition. At that time, Yen Hsi-shan was occupying Shansi, Charhar, and Suiyuan; Feng Yü-hsiang controlled Shantung, Honan, Shensi and Kansu; Lee Tsung-jen and Pai Ts'ung-hsi were occupying Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan and Hupei; Chang Hsueh-liang controlled the Northeast; therefore, all these provinces were in semi-independent. The National Government had direct control of only Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Fukien. The total number of the military exceeded 2.2 million because of the large forces maintained by the local military leaders²⁰. National

revenues were also sharply reduced because these military leaders controlled their respective regions and withheld tax incomes at will.

China faced financial difficulty at that time since the National Government had to shoulder the foreign debts left by the Peking Government after the Northern Expedition. The debts amounted to 700 million US dollars. The government had to meet huge military expenses and thus faced vicious financial cycles because it could not make both ends meet and budgets always in the red.

For example, in 1929, the yearly budget of national revenues was put at 457 million dollars and it was reduced to 357 million dollars after paying the interests and principals of foreign debts. This amount was 40 million dollars short in just the spending of military expenses, which amounted to more than 396 million²¹, not to mention other administrative construction expenditures.

Thus in consideration of either military nationalization or avoiding financial collapse, the reduction of troops was imperative. Based on this target, the National Government set up the National Army Reorganization Committee in Nanking on January 1, 1929 and convened a conference of reorganization, deciding to reduce the National Army to not more than 65 divisions, 48 cavalry brigades, 18 artillery regiments, 8 engineering regiments with numbering 800,000 in total²². The defense budget was temporarily cut to 192 million dollars per year, not including the Navy and the Air Force. The plan was to be implemented in three phases and later revised as: Central troops, the First Army Group, reduced to some 300,500; Feng Yü-hsiang's army, the Second Army Group, 270,000; Yen Hsi-shan's army, the Third Army Group, some 200,000; Lee Tsung-jen and Pai Ts'ung-hsi's Kwangsi Army, the Fourth Army Group, 230,000; Chang Hsueh-liang's Northeast Army, 240,000; and other troops, 358,000. The total number of the National Army was reorganized to compose of some 1,650,000, which was one-fourth less than before²³. Although it was more than double the original planned 800,000 target, the reorganization eventually resulted in the rebellions of the regional commanders.

On the surface, the regional commanders fully supported the reorganization of the National Army and attended the conference and reached agreements on the reduction. They actually waited for the right opportunity to boycott the plan and obstructed the implementation of the reorganization, and even rebelled when their boycott failed. Lee Tsung-jen and Pai Ts'ung-hsi of the Kwangsi Army were the first to stage armed rebellion. They claimed that the reorganization measures taken by the National Government were not fair to them and thus waged war against the government troops at the end of February that year by deliberately relieving the post of Governor Lu Tang-p'ing of Hunan, who obeyed the order of the

National Government by regularly turning in tax collections, and forcing him to leave hunan²⁴.

Feng Yü-hsiang of the Northwest Army also rebelled after the Kwangsi Army's subversion was immediately squelched by the National Government. Feng had a bad reputation for his repeated surrenders. The reason he obeyed the National Government and joined the Northern Expedition was purely to strike Wu P'ei-fu and to strengthen his own force. Feng thus became warlord in the middle and lower valley of the Yellow River by expanding his military force to Honan, Shantung and other provinces after the Northern Expedition.

Feng accepted orders from the National Government superficially but actually collaborated with other regional commanders and the Communists, held up all tax revenues in his region designated for the National Government, and repeatedly extorted the revenues from the government as his expenses at a time when the government financed him 500,000 dollars a month as military expenses. He stepped up his extortions from the National Government when the Kwangsi Army rebelled, increasing the monthly financial assistance to 1,500,000 dollars, on the other hand, he secretly collaborated with the Kwangsi authorities and openly destroyed the Peking-Hankou Railway, as well as held up coaches passing by the Lunghai Railway and obstructed the National Government from attacking the Kwangsi troops²⁵. In October 1929, he incited his troops to jointly sign a letter voice against the military reorganization and pressed the youth in central Honan and western Hupei. This resulted in waves of rebellions in 1929. At the end of October 1929, Feng's troops fought fiercely against the Central Army southeast of Loyang and was defeated after two months. The battle ended temporarily when Feng withdrew his troops from Honan.

But when Feng rebelled, Chang Fa-k'uei stood up against the government in Kwanghsi and closed in Kwangtung and Shih You-san also attempted to rebel in northern Anhuei. T'ang Sheng-chih cabled support to Shih You-san as the rebellion of Feng Yü-hsiang was repelled, attempting to capture Wuhan by advancing southward along the Peking-Hankou Railway. But all these rebellions were short-lived as the National Government troops cracked down roughly.

President Chiang Kai-shek of the National Government adopted the policy of tolerance at this time, thus sought to achieve harmony with all parties concerned, and let bygones be bygones. He did not try to root out the fundamental forces of the regional commanders even after repelling these rebellions.

In early 1930 most regional commanders, headed by Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yü-hsiang and Lee Tsung-jen, jointly cabled all concerned in opposition to the Na-

tional Government and requested reconsideration of the National Army reorganization²⁶. Wang Ching-wei, who had been leaning to the left and organizing his own regime in Wuhan, responded immediately and thus formed a grand alliance of forces against Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government. Then, the Civil War broke out in 1930. The troops mobilized by both sides during the battle amounted to 1.6 million and the War lasted for six months. The rebellious regional commanders and politicians formed their bogus "National Government" in Peking.

Fortunately, the National Government squelched the rebellion in time on account of its strong military force, abundant financial resources and the positive support of Chang Hsueh-liang's Northeast Army that was sent into the south to strike the rebels and recover the Peking-Tientsin area²⁷. This rebellion was the largest in scale after the Republic of China was established. Both sides suffered tremendous losses. Casualties on the rebel side amounted to more than 200,000 while the Central Army had more than 90,000 deaths and injuries. But after the battle, nationalization of the military was implemented smoothly.

Although the National Government had timely repelled the regional commanders' rebellions in 1929-1930, the rebellious Chinese Communists obtained the opportunity to emerge strong. The Chinese Communists openly rebelled against the government in 1927. They first staged the Nanchang Riot, then the Autumn Harvest Riot in Hupei and Hunan and Riots in Haifeng, Lufeng and Canton. They did not get what they wanted however. In fact they suffered internal strife as a result of the loss of large numbers of cadres due to the strong military force of the National Army. The communists did not gain popular support because they slaughtered innocent people at will and rampaged personal property wherever they went.

As Li Li-san took power in the Communist Party, he tried to pursue the so-called "Li Li-san line" to expand strength and create the so-called "climax of the revolution²⁸" when the regional commanders rebelled. At this time the Red Army increased to 15 corps with more than 60,000 regulars. According to the report presented by Ku Wei-chün to the International Confederation Investigation Committee, there were Communist rebellious activities in 181 counties throughout nine provinces in China, their main base was in Southern Kiangsi²⁹. Chiang Kai-shek also noted in his book, *The Soviet Union in China*, which was published later that "their (the Communists') harassing activities were rampant in seven provinces: Hunan, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Fukien, Honan, Hupei and Anhwei, covering areas totalling more than 200,000 square miles³⁰. Therefore, the National Govern-

ment were determined to attack the Communists from all sides after the Civil War in 1930.

The Central Army staged five campaigns against the Chinese Communists: the first two campaigns ended in vain while the third one was suspended because of the September 18 Mukden Incident. The Chinese Communists had established the so-called "Chinese Soviet Republic." "Soviet Regions" were set-up in the remote areas of Hupei, Hunan, Kiangsi, Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien and Shensi after the January 28 Incident broke out. When National Government could not send reinforcements to fight against the invading Japanese during the Incident because of restraints by the Chinese Communists, they realized that it had to maintain internal security before expelling foreign invasion. Thus they started the fourth anti-communist campaign. But the Japanese forcefully occupied Jehol and attacked all passes along the Great Wall even though the military actions against the Communists were being conducted smoothly. Thus the campaign was forced to suspend again. After the Great Wall Battle, the government started its fifth thorough campaign against the Communists and finally succeeded with the adoption of fort tactice and the "thirty percent military and seventy percent political" policy line. They forced the Communist troops to escape southwestward from south Kiangsi to north Shensi. The success had significant influence on the forthcoming eight-year Sino-Japanese War and national build-up later on, because from then on, the National Government was able to maintain the stability of political and social situation in the North, Central and South provinces and smoothly engage in econmic constructions.

As the anticommunist campaign continued, military commander Tsai T'ing-k'ai and Chiang Kuang-nai based in Fukien, collaborated with politician Chen Ming-shu, to stage the so-called "Fukien Rebellion". They declared the province as independent in the winter of 1933. In June 1936, Lee Tsung-jen and Pai Ts'ung-hsi also rebelled in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. All these rebellions were soon repelled by the National Government.

In short, the regional military commanders repeatedly rebelled after the Northern Expedition mainly because they owned troops. Therefore, everytime their personal interests were damaged, they stood up and rebelled, totally ignoring national interests. The greatest difference between these commanders and the Peiyang warlords before the Northern Expedition was that they had modern knowledge and tried harder to strengthen their armaments to beef up defense. Because personal profits were put before national interests, their rebellions were more serious than those staged by the Northern warlords. Fortunately, the National

Government made quick decision, taking the right measures and squelched the rebellious troops rapidly. And from this we can realize what a difficult situation the National Government and Chiang Kai-shek faced, why the basic policy was to swallow national humiliation while shouldering heavy responsibility and why they had to maintain internal security before expelling Japanese invasion.

External factors of the Chinese Communist rebellion were part of the Russian plot to communize the whole world through the Communist International. It was an imperialist invasion using the means of divisive subversion and armed violence. As to the internal situation, the communization would result in the total destruction of traditional Chinese culture because Communist thoughts, measures and systems were in conflict with Chinese traditions and the national situation. The Chinese Communists cooperated with the Kuomintang before the Northern Expedition mainly because they wanted to utilize and divide the Chinese Nationalist Party in order to strengthen themselves and communize China. After the Northern Expedition, the destruction of social and economic stability in various parts of the country by Communist armed riots far exceeded those by regional commanders. That was the reason why the National Government deemed the total destruction of the Chinese Communists as its first priority while implementing the national policy to maintain internal security before repelling foreign invasion.

In summary, from the above-mentioned difficulties both internal and external, we can understand that the Northern Expedition had reunified China in the name, but China actually suffered crises because of Soviet and Japanese invasions and continuous rebellions by Chinese Communists and regional military commanders. Besides this, the National Government faced a financial crisis, with revenues which were unable to meet expenses and accumulated external debts beyond its shouldering capability, plus natural disasters in northern provinces in consecutive years and the big floods in the middle and lower Yangtze Valley in 1931. China's national livelihood and economy were on the edge of bankruptcy. However, the National Government managed to overcome the difficulties one by one and actively engaged in various spiritual and material reconstructions to strengthen and deepen the foundation of national richness and strength. This period of history can be said to be a miracle which deserves incomparable respect.

IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

China entered the Period of Political Tutelage after the Northern Expedition. According to the explanation by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the so-called Political Tutelage is to engage in constructions by means of revolution, train the people to practice democratic politics, and prepare for the implementation of constitutional politics³¹. The greatest achievements obtained by the Chinese government during this period were: 1) the establishment of the five-power constitutional system of central government; 2) the definite formation centralized, committee-styled province-level local administrative system; and 3) local administration below the level of county.

According to San-min Chu-i, the Five-power Constitution and the Fundamentals of National Build-up, the difference between the Chinese government organization and that of Western democratic countries is the separation of executive, legislative, judiciary, examination and control powers. This is one of the characteristics of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political ideas which combined traditional Chinese and Western political systems and one of the political goals he pursued all his life. But it was not realized during his lifetime. The set-up of a Control Department within the headquarters of the Revolutionary Army established in Canton in 1923 was a preliminary symbol in the realization of his political theory. But when the National Government was formed in 1925, the Control Yuan was set up to exercise control power. Judicial power was in the hands of both the Public Functionaries Disciplinary Yuan and the Tali Yuan (the Supreme Court). Examination power was exercised by the examination section of the Control Yuan. Executive power belonged to the National Government, while legislative power was put in the charge of the Political Commission of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party. Although it was not the separation of five powers its miniature form was there already. In February 1928, the government proclaimed a revised National Government Organic Law and decided to set up the Supreme Court, the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan³². The Legislative Yuan was not organized because the country was still in the Period of Military Administration. Half a year later, the fifth plenary session of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang formally passed a resolution to set up the five Yuans according to the Fundamentals of National Build-up, and drafted the legislations of Organic Laws of the Executive, Legislative, Judiciary, Examination and Control Yuans. On October 8, the government appointed T'an Yen-k'ai as the

Prime Minister; Hu Han-min, President of the Legislative Yuan; Wang Ts'ung-huei, President of the Judiciary Yuan; Tai Chuan-hsien, President of the Examination Yuan; and Ts'ai Yüan-pei, President of the Control Yuan³³. Thus the five-power central government system was completed.

The five-power central government organization differs greatly from the three-power government organization of ordinary democratic countries in its separation of examination power from executive power and control power from legislative power. Under the traditional Chinese political system, examination power was usually inclined to be independent and not put completely under the jurisdiction of the executive branch, particularly in regards to the control power. To conform with the good tradition of Chinese history, Dr. Sun Yat-sen adopted the separation of five powers, making the Chinese civil service system through examinations more independent and less involved with the disputes of political parties. Although the independence of the control power seemed to be sharing power with the legislature, this arrangement kept the parliament from abusing its impeachment power to force the government into submission, which made it necessary for the government to draw criticism at its every move. Thus its advantage is the same as the independence of the examination power, that is, to avoid unnecessary disputes among political parties³⁴.

In short, the five-power government system defines more clearly than the three-power system the boundary between political rights and the ruling powers. It not only preserves the good traditions of the Chinese political system but also improves the Western democratic political system.

Another organizational characteristics of the National Government during this period was the adoption of the committee-type administration by the National Government. China had gradually been separating powers and adopting the committee-type administration by appointing the Tzaihsiang (the Premier) ever since the T'ang and Sung dynasties, particularly during the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. The executive branch of the Ming was the Cabinet and that of the Ch'ing was Chün-chi Chu and Tsungli Yamen, both of which adopted the committee system. The advantage of the committee system is the separation of powers, gathering wise opinions from more brains to avoid possibility of someone to doing something without asking for approval. After the establishment of the Republic of China, people felt that the committee system was more imperative than ever before, especially after Yüan Shih-k'ai's attempt to become Emperor of China and the rebellions by Northern warlords. The National Government started to adopt the committee system in 1918 when the assembly-

men who went to the South collectively elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Tsen Chun-hsuan, Lu Jung-t'ing, T'ang Chi-yao, T'ang Shao-i, Wu T'ing-fang and Lin Pao-i as the seven Presidents of the Canton Military Government³⁵. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen formulated the organization of the Chinese Nationalist Party in Shanghai, he changed some party units such as the Military Commission into a committee system. But the functions of the committee system within the Kuomintang were not obvious because of his personal prestige and his being the President of the Party. After Dr. Sun Yat-sen passed away, functions of the committee system within the Party were brought into full play because of the adoption of collective leadership, it also influenced the National Government to adopt this system.

According to the Provisional Political Tutelage Constitution of 1931, the Chairman and his members of the National Government, the Presidents and Vice Presidents of the five Yuans were all appointed by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party. That is, the Party exercised part of the parliament functions. In the opinion of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang had to supervise the government temporality to train people to exercise their political rights before the implementation of constitutional administration. This would curtail the various evil effects resulting from people not having enough political knowledge and the warlords' and politicians' playing of politics during the early years of the Chinese Republic. The set-up of the Executive and Legislative Yuans however, also demonstrated the determination of the Chinese Nationalist Party to implement the parliamentary system.

As to the confirmation of a centralized committee-type administrative system, at the provincial level it could be deemed as an important and big reform in the history of the Chinese local administrative system. Influenced by the local administrative systems of previous dynasties, the highest local executive organizations under the National Government all adopted the chief system, not committee system. It was the same in the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. The Ming set up Department of Civil and Financial Affairs under each province, with the Department Chief and his deputy equal to Governor and Deputy Governor, while the Ch'ing appointed a Governor (Hsün-fu) to each province to be in charge of civil affairs and appointed a Governor-General (Tsung-tu) in charge of military and civil affairs two or three provinces each. The Governor-General and Governor were superior and subordinate but they kept each other in check. Both of them had the right to report directly to the emperor.

The Chinese Republic first adopted the Military Governor-Viceroy system, with the Military Governor in charge of military affairs and the Viceroy in charge

of civil affairs. The original intention of this arrangement was to follow the Ch'ing system, covertly separated military affairs from civil affairs. In spite of good intentions the Military Governor later became the head of the province while the Viceroy became the civilian subordinate to him because the political situation during early Republican years was unstable. The Military Governor controlled the troops, held the reins of provincial government, and was naturally inclined to act at his own will and this eventually resulted in the segmentation of regional military commanders.

When the National Government was formed, the collective leadership system was promoted to the province-level local administrations because it had been adopted by the entire Party and the center of political power.³⁶ The National Government not only appointed Chairman and members of the provincial government and department chiefs but also supervised the provincial Chairman because of its power of appointment. The Provincial Government was the highest authority and decision-making body in the province and all important affairs had to be approved by the committee. Obviously, this system could bring the functions of the centralized government more into full play than the provincial chief system of the early Republic years and previous dynasties. After the Northern Expedition, regional military commanders rebelled one after another, but they could not last long because of the adoption of provincial committee system³⁷. Therefore up to now, China still adopts this kind of province-level administrative system.

There were also defects in the provincial committee system, such as the difficulty in reaching a consensus and making quick decisions because everything had to be discussed during the committee meetings. Thus the National Government later heightened the authority of the secretariat and appointed a secretary-general to assist the provincial Chairman in processing general political affairs and coordinating the opinions of various departments and provincial committee members. All the departments were also concentrated in one office building to shorten the processing time of official documents,³⁸ to make the centralized and joint consultation-type province-level local administrative system more perfect.

During the late Ch'ing period, the local administrative system below the provincial level gradually formed into the Tao-Prefecture-County three-level system. Tao was originally a supervisory official, following the Ming system and further dividing Fen-hsün Tao and Fen-shou Tao. The Fen-hsün Tao was in charge of all control and military affairs while the Fen-shou Tao was in charge of taxation and finance. Tao later became a local executive unit below the Province and above the Prefecture level³⁹. This system was too complicated to work efficiently. Therefore

after the Republic was founded, the government abolished the organization of Tao and prefecture and set up counties only under the provinces. When Yüan Shih-k'ai held the reins of government he restored the set-up of Tao with responsibilities to supervise local offices on the ground that there were difficulties in the management of the two-level Province-County system because the provincial region was too expansive and there were too many counties under their jurisdiction⁴⁰. After the Northern Expedition, the government first restored the Province-County two-level system but later tightened its control over the county administrations by appointing regional administrative specialists, Hsing-cheng Tsuch'a Chuan-yüan, who was concurrently commander of the sub-public security department in 1934, because of the campaigns against the Communists and the emphasis being put on regional peace and order⁴¹.

During the Period of Political Tutelage, the County was the emphasis of the implementation of administration. According to the Fundamentals of National Build-up, the County was a self-governed office⁴². Therefore, the National Government attached much importance to the implementation of County and City administration and the uniformity of systems after the Northern Expedition. They formulated the County Organic Law and abolished the traditional county assistant system, ordering the provinces throughout the country to implement the County Organic Law in three phases 1) accomplishing the reorganization of county administrations before April 1929; 2) setting the county boundaries and establishing regional offices before April 1930; and 3) organizing the formation of districts, villages, communities, and neighborhoods before October 1930⁴³.

In December 1928, the Ministry of the Interior specially convened a civil affairs conference among the five Southeastern provinces and special cities of Peking and Shanghai. The directors of the Department of Civil Affairs were ordered to select and send five county magistrates and chiefs of the Bureau of Public Security each to attend the conference together with them. Major issues discussed during the conference were the organization of county administrations, the set-up of county self-governing regions and the formation of villages and neighborhoods⁴⁴. According to these data, the county administration organization being implemented that time was: the county was headed by the county magistrate, in charge of all administrative affairs of the county; financial expenditures for the county had to be listed and published monthly; the county magistrate must accept the opinions of the County Party Committee regarding administrative affairs, reply to the Party Committee or report to the provincial government to study and act accordingly if there were difficulties in their im-

plementation. Sections of civil affairs, finance, constructions and education were set up under the county administration with section chief and several staff members each, all were appointed by the county magistrate and approved by the provincial government.

Thus the characteristics of the Chinese county administration and organization during this period were: 1) the ruling party supervised the administration with the county party committee as supervisory body of the county administration, in place of the county council; and 2) the openness of finance⁴⁵. Furthermore, the government formulated and issued the County Magistrate Examination Provisional Regulations in order to be cautious and prudent in the selection of county magistrates. It requested the provincial governments to hold examinations for the selection of county magistrates in their own provinces. All those who passed the examinations must be trained before assuming posts as county magistrates. According to reports, Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Shantung, Hopei, Charhar, Suiyuan, Hupei, Hunan, Yunnan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung all had had examinations for the selection of county magistrates according to these regulations⁴⁶. The Ministry of the Interior later formulated registration measure for legal county magistrates based on the qualifications of recommended appointment rank officials to meet the practical needs of various provinces and selected qualified registered candidates to send them to serve in remote provinces of Ninghsia, Kansu, Ch'inghai, Hsinking, Suiyuan and Charhar. Between February and December in 1934, 327 qualified candidates were registered⁴⁷.

Regarding county administrative personnel, the Ministry of the Interior also issued circular orders to the provinces according to the Local Administrative Personnel Training Regulations ordering them to set up Local Administrative Personnel Training Institutes to train various levels of local administrative personnel. In 1935, these kinds of training institutes had been set up in Kiangsu, Chekiang, Hupei, Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Honan, Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Shensi, Kansu, Ch'inghai and Charhar and more than 4,000 county magistrates and local administrative personnel had been trained⁴⁸.

In short, the government had attached much importance to the selection and appointment of county-level administrative personnel during the "Golden Decade" and systemized through examination, selection and training to upgrade their quality. With appointment power in the hands of the National Government, examination and selection were combined as one procedure while policies and orders of the National Government could be carried out thoroughly.

The other two important reforms were the establishment of the public

security system and the execution of the budget system. China had established a police system, according to the practice of Western countries, in the late Ch'ing period. But since the police were of poor qualities during the late Ch'ing and early Republican years, local peace and order was hard to maintain. What is more, police everywhere even oppressed innocent people. Local peace and order gradually deteriorated, particularly in rural areas after the Northern Expedition because of the Communist rebellion and the raging of bandits. Thus the government exerted all-out efforts to set it in order. County police bureaus were reformed as public security bureaus and public security regions were set up under the county to be in charge of garrison and sanitary affairs. The county also set up militia corps with all fit adults obligated to serve in the militia corps to strengthen local self-defense capabilities and thus laid a preliminary foundation for the establishment of the conscription system. Modeled on the local administrative personnel selection measures, police personnel also had to take examinations before being selected and trained for their jobs, so that quality could be upgraded⁴⁹.

The county budget system was implemented after 1935 although a few counties had prepared for this much earlier. According to the Chekiang Provincial Government Gazette, the budgets of some counties in Chekiang were as follows:

County	Total budget of current expenses in 1936	Defense		Administration	
		Public		Party and self-	
		security expense		government expenses	
		N	%	N	%
Shaohsing	1,122,199 (Dollar)	254,748	22.70	120,585	10.75
Chin	1,464,719	449,769	30.71	191,809	13.10
Linhai	241,712	64,924	28.83	68,421	28.31
Shouchang	71,565	21,973	30.70	21,305	29.77
Lungyu	186,560	69,333	37.16	38,641	20.71
Yiwu	132,478	42,285	31.19	22,021	16.62
Tsungteh	304,785	36,196	11.88	33,494	10.99

	Education		Constructions	
	Education and cultural expenses		Construction expenses	
	N	%	N	%
Shaohsing	158,685	14.14	62,707	5.59
Chin	332,165	22.68	67,273	4.59
Linhai	66,071	26.92	13,374	5.53

Shouchang	13,899	19.42	2,680	3.75
Lungyu	33,816	18.13	6,871	3.68
Yiwu	47,222	36.65	3,499	2.64
Tsungteh	49,890	16.37	6,088	2.00

Sources: Chekiang Provincial Government Gazette, Vol. 2934, pp. 33-42;
Vol. 2936, pp. 28-36; Vol. 2943, pp. 28-32; Vol. 2951, pp. 28-34;
Vol. 2952, pp. 22-26 and pp. 37-44.

Although the above statistics lists only a few Chekiang counties, they show that the county administration in Chekiang at the time emphasized defense. It was natural because local peace and order was bad and no construction could be done without proper capability in self-defense. Actually, it was not only Chekiang that emphasized the importance of defense—public security. All the rest of the provinces in the country did the same. For example in Fukien, public security expenses amounted to 20.50% of the provincial budget in 1935 and 22.40% in 1936. Both ranked the first among all expenses⁵⁰. At this time, the county administration of the country not only stressed public security as the primary concern but also made it the basis to combine defense, administration, education and construction together in one.

What the local administration below the county level strived to implement after the Northern Expedition was the establishment of District and Paochia systems. Since the Fundamentals of National Build-up provided that the county was a self-government unit, the practice of county self-government was primarily to make the administrative organization within the county sound. Thus the government twice revised the County Organic Law in 1929 and 1930, providing that the administrative organization under the county level was District and that each District had its own office with a District Administrator appointed by the government. Each District was comprised of 10 to 50 villages and towns. Hamlets that had more than 100 families were called Villages (hsiang) while those of less than 100 families were grouped as Villages (hsiang). Streets (chieh) that had more than 100 families were named Towns (chen) while those of less than 100 families were organized as Villages. Both Villages and Towns were not allowed to have more than 1,000 families. They had to set up preparatory offices and then convene citizens' assemblies to establish Village or Town Halls. Under the Village or Town, 25 families were organ-

ized as Community(Lü) while each five families were called Lin. Residents within the Community also assembled to discuss concerned matters⁵¹. As of November 1931, most counties in Chekiang and Kiangsu had taken these measure; many counties in Anhuei, Kiangsi, Shantung, Hopei, Hunan, Hupei, Kwangtung. Fukien, Kweichow and Charhar had organized Villages and Towns and set up Village and Town Halls; Honan, Liaoning and Jehol established some, while Shansi, Shensi, Suiyuan, Kansu, Ninghsia, Ch'inghai, Yunnan, Hsinking, Kirin and Helungkiang were actively undergoing the process of organization. Only Szechuan and Kwangsi did not start⁵². Later, because the government tried to get rid of bandits and Communists from the countryside, it specially emphasized the functions of District-level administrative organizations and reorganized Communities and Neighborhoods into the Paochia system, which provided each family to have its head, 10 families were organized as unit called Chia while 10 Chias were Pao, both units having their Chiefs. Villages and Towns which had more than five Paos were ordered to set up a combined office called Lien-Pao headed by a Director selected among the five Pao Chiefs⁵³. This made the Chinese administrative organization system under the county level after 1932 as follows:

County—District (Village and Town)—Lien-Pao—Pao—Chia—Family
—People

In nature, County, District, Village and Town were different from Pao, Chia and Lien-Pao. County, District, Village and Town were regular units of local administration and their heads were appointed by the government so the units could be called official offices while Pao, Chia and Lien-Pao were civil organizations with their heads elected by residents.

The complete establishment of local administration systems below the level of County enabled the government policies and orders to be carried out thoroughly from the County down to the grassroots of Pao and Chia units. It trained people to exercise their political rights. In addition, it made great contributions to secret-keeping and espionage-prevention, the organization and trading of basic Pao-Chia militia corps and the implementation of military service administration after the practice of the conscription system because of the tight and rigid local administrative organization. The government ordered all provinces to engage in national military training to meet national crisis when the September 18 and January 28

Incidents broke out. All the counties were able to set up strict national military training organizations and make the training widespread and deep based within the local administrative organization, especially so in the implementation of the military service administration. Although all the counties had set up military service sections to take charge of responsibility, it was the Pao and Chia Chiefs and Directors of Lien-Pao offices, particularly the latter, that were actually responsible for the draft of soldiers. They brought their functions into full display because they were in the power center of the entire civil organization.

In the second national civil affairs administration conference in 1933, the Ministry of the Interior presented the concept of setting up experimental counties for the government to implement county administration more effectively. The government first planned to set up experimental counties in Kiangning of Kiangsu, Lanhsi of Chekiang, Hotse and Tsouping of Shantung, Yangchu, T'aiyuan and Yutze of Shansi, Huei and Yu of Honan, Ting of Hopei, Hsiangt'an of Hunan, Hsuanhua of Chahar and Kunming, Chaotung, Yuhsi, Paoshan and Yiliang of Yunnan⁵⁴. But only Hotse and Tsouping of Shantung, Ting of Hopei and Lanhsi of Chekiang really pushed the idea through and made outstanding achievements. This experimental county organization made great contribution in the promotion of compulsory education, the simplification of county administration, the cutting down and merging of redundant organizations, reformation of land administration, and the practice of a new fiscal system. Thus Chen Chih-mai noted when discussing the achievements of the Lanhsi experimental county that "it was most meaningful in expanding the experiment's success to other counties."⁵⁵

At a time when the democratic system had not been fully implemented, the system under which everything was discussed and decided by a committee was the most democratic in spirit. The reformation of local administration below the county level has special significance. Government orders and policies could be carried out from the level of county further down to the very base of—Pao and Chia—because of the tight, rigid local basic structure. This was almost unprecedented in the history of China. Also because of the tight, rigid local basic structure, the strength of its functions to keep secrets and prevent espionage activities, and the ease of organizing local militia corps to defend the communities, national military training could be promoted rapidly. Thus the conscription system was smoothly implemented. All of these made important contributions to China's success against the invading Japanese army.

V. THE MILITARY REFORMS AND RENOVATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The nationalization of the military had been a goal pursued by Dr. Sun Yat-sen when he engaged in national revolution and national build-up. The segmentation and continuous rebellion of the warlords after the establishment of the Republic of China made him know thoroughly that in order to accomplish the great mission of national revolution, the Chinese Nationalist Party had to have its own military force as the means to organize the government and wipe out the warlords. Thus separately, he reorganized the Kuomintang, founded the Hwampoa Military Academy, organized and trained troops in 1924. He also let the ruling party supervise the army and political authorities to lead the military. These ideas were fully realized through Chiang Kai-shek's strict and thorough execution. Thus the National Revolutionary Army was able to fight numerically superior enemy, rapidly defeat the warlords, and accomplish the mission of the Northern Expedition and reunify China.

The National Government used all-out efforts to reduce and reorganize troops after the Northern Expedition in order to further accomplish military nationalization and solve the problem of financial difficulties. However, this effort resulted in armed rebellions by regional military commanders.

After the Civil War in 1930, based on original intentions, the government actively executed its reorganization plans. However the plans changed slightly because of the September 18 and January 28 Incidents as well as the seriousness of the Communist rebellion. In June 1932, the Military Commission decided to reorganize and reduce the National Army to only 48 corps with two divisions each under their command, totalling 96 divisions: "Class A" divisions had three infantry brigades which commanded two regiments each; "Class B" divisions had two infantry brigades which commanded three regiments each, plus one artillery, engineering and transportation battalion each and one cavalry and special agents company each; "Class C" divisions commanded two infantry brigades, with two regiments each under it, plus one artillery and engineering battalion each and one cavalry, transportation and secret agent company each. The government first reorganized the troops of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Shansi and Honan provinces into ten divisions⁵⁶. This reorganization plan was expanded to more than that of the 65 divisions formulated in 1929 mainly because the National Army had to maintain strong force to face national crises and rampant Communist rebellion.

Later on, because of smooth military actions against the Communists, Chiang

Kai-shek of the Military Commission accepted suggestions made by German military adviser Hans von Saakt and others. He personally ordered the reorganization the National Army into 60 divisions within four years: to reorganize and train 6 to 10 divisions in 1935; 16 to 20 divisions in 1936; 20 to 30 divisions in 1937; and 4 to 16 divisions in 1938. The government started from troops under direct command of the National Government and would schedule to reorganize part of the Central Army into 33 arranged divisions which would command four regiments each while 18 divisions of the Northeast Army were to be reorganized into 10 arranged divisions and two new organized divisions. The arranged divisions were based on the original personnel while the new organized divisions were composed of soldiers from various divisions, organizing soldiers according to native hometowns. The government also set up the division of administrative districts to pave the way for the conscription system. Commanding officers below the rank of corps commanding general of the reorganized troops were not allowed to be concurrent commanders of their subordinate units⁵⁷.

Following year, the government set up the Army Arrangement Department in Nanchang which was moved to Wuchang later, and appointed Gen. Chen Ch'eng as its Director, planned to train the National Army to become instructory divisions in phases. The equipment of the instructory divisions, would be maximum modernized. The government also set up instructory brigades as model troops of the new army. The reformation of special forces, cavalry, artillery and engineering troops were under the charge of Gen. Chen Ch'eng, who also removed and changed weaponry equipment. Artillery and engineering troops were being reformed and trained in Nanchang under the charge of Lo Cho-ying. In order to modernize the military and to suit the needs of new equipment, the government again adjusted the organization of the army in 1936, reducing the number of larger units like divisions and brigades while strengthening units smaller than regiments. All the small caliber cannons of various units were concentrated and regrouped as battalions under the command of the division headquarters. Mortars were organized as platoons and turned to the command of battalions, one howitzer company each was added to the infantry regiment, and the infantry company was reformed as a nine-squad mixed organization in order to enhance its fire-power. The government removed and changed old-styled weapons, increased heavy weaponry equipment, reduced the number of infantry, and set up independent special forces units⁵⁸, gradually mechanizing the military.

The plan at that time was to adjust 20 divisions in 1936 and reorganize another 20 divisions in 1937 following the 1936 measures making the process

faster. The government formulated two uniform organizations: "Class A" organization, adopting the 1936 re-set division organization, to have equipment gradually equal to those of the regular divisions of other countries; and "Class B" organization, adopting the 1935 arranged division measures, equal to the reserve divisions of other countries in nature. Furthermore, authorities carried out the plan to renovate military weaponry and increase heavy armament, to reduce the number of infantry and accomplish the organization of various special forces under the direct command of the divisions for the sake of strengthening combat capability of various units. This effort made the Chinese army mechanized and modernized with more progress than ever.

After the Sian Incident, the Military Commission further reorganized the Northeast Army headed by Chang Hsueh-liang, strived to wipe out the practice of reporting "ghost soliders" by commanders and put all troops under the direct command and the payrolls of the National Government, this made the chain of military commands unified and strengthened the movement and training of troops⁶⁰.

When the forces of the National Government entered Szechuan because of extermination campaigns against the Chinese Communists, the government reorganized the troops in Szechuan and Hsik'ang twice starting in 1935, planned to reduce the Szechuan troops from 345 to 213 regiments and use the numerical designations of the army being applied after the national reorganization. They were organized into eight corps commanding 23 divisions and one brigade. The government set up a branch of the Central Military Academy in Chengtu to train former officers of the Szechuan Army and recruit new cadets at the same time, to cultivate cadres for the Szechuan army in the future⁶¹. This gradually nationalized the local troops in Szechuan and Hsik'ang and put them under the direct command of the National Government.

However, reorganization was not thorough because it was under the charge of Gen. Liu Hsiang of the Szechuan Army. Another reorganization was conducted in 1937, which reduced and abolished one-third of the troops. The Szechuan Army was thus reinforced with personnel and completely combined into the organization of the National Army. As of this time, the goal of military nationalization was basically achieved.

The National Government had strived not only for the nationalization of the military but also the renovation of weaponry and equipment. Except for the above-mentioned renovation of the weaponry of various troops, the National Government also set up transportation, chemical and other special force army

corps. This made the military far more modernized than the time before the Northern Expedition, although the national army's equipment was still a long way behind those of industrialized countries.

The fastest progress in the military reorganization was achieved by the Air Force. The National Government set up an Aviation Department and owned a small Air Force (some nine aircrafts) during the period of the Northern Expedition. The Department was reformed into the Aviation Administration in charge of aviation administrative affairs because of the taking over of the Aviation Administration and its affiliated offices under the Peking Government after the Northern Expedition. The former Flying Squad was also renamed as Aviation Squadron with 32 planes under three squads, mostly Junkers made in Germany⁶². It fought against the rebels in coordination with the Army and the Navy when Lee Tsung-jen staged rebellion in Wuhan. The government founded the aviation classes in the Central Military Academy for the purpose of cultivating talents for the Air Force. The Aviation Squadron was expanded into six squadrons and set up a reconnaissance squadron when the Kwangtung air force was to the command of the Aviation Administration in 1930. Later, the aviation classes were enlarged into a flying school. Aircraft repair plants were set up in Nanking and several other places. The number of air stations throughout the country was increased to 23. The organization of the Aviation Administration was again expanded into the Aviation Commission in 1934, with the number of Aviation Squadrons increased to eight: two bomber squadrons, three reconnaissance-bomber squadrons and two attacker squadrons. The government also set up an aircraft manufacturing factory and designated Central Communications and Wuhan University to set up departments of aviation engineering⁶³. The strength of the Air Force was further enhanced after the air force commanded by Chen Chi-t'ang in Kwangtung returned to the fold of the government in 1936. The Chinese Air Force increased the number of its aircrafts to 314, with two heavy bomber squadrons, eight light bomber squadrons, ten destroyer squadrons, nine reconnaissance squadrons and two attacker squadrons⁶⁴. Although the number of planes was still not large enough, the Air Force was well-trained with high morale. Thus it could heavily damage the enemy when they fought against the numerically superior Japanese during the second Sino-Japanese War.

After the Northern Expedition, the National Government also attached much importance to the reform and build-up of the Navy. The Chinese Navy had only the first and the second fleets, a training fleet and a torpedo-boat flotilla, with 44 vessels totalling 30,201 tons in 1927⁶⁵. The government established the Naval

Ministry in 1929 in order to enhance the reform and build-up of the Navy. The Naval Ministry then formulated plans for reform and build-up in six years: to construct in the first year one armored cruiser and one cruiser-transport vessel, to be completed in three years; and to build four small destroyers, four submarines, two small gunboats, eight large torpedo boats and ten planes within one year. The Navy also prepared to build a naval base at Hsiangshan in Chekiang, repairing one-fourth of old vessels, and set up a Naval School and send personnel to study abroad. The second year was separated into two phases, the first phase to construct one armored cruiser, cruiser, transport vessel, submarine and carrier each, eight large destroyers, four large submarine and one large mine sweeper; and the second phase, one cruiser, four large torpedo boats and ten airplanes, the repair and construction of one 1,000-foot and 750-foot shipyard each, and the major and minor repair of one-fourth of old vessels each. The navy also planned to build a steel refinery plant, to purchase 30 pieces of 3-inch cannons. 20 4-inch cannons and eight fast-speed fortress cannons, and establish a Naval Command and Staff College.

In the third year, one submarine carrier, large mine sweeper and aircraft carrier each, eight large destroyers, four large submarines and ten small destroyers, the construction of ten large and small docks, the repair of one-fourth of old vessels, and the purchase of 500 pieces of new 300-pound and 500-pound torpedos each were planned.

The Navy planned to build four large destroyers, ten airplanes, four small submarines, two large gunboats, one armored cruiser, large submarine, small mine sweeper and submarine carrier each, repair one-fourth of old vessels, and purchase eight pieces of 8-inch fast-speed fortress cannons in the fourth year while in the fifth year, build one armored cruiser, small torpedo sweeper, submarine carrier and transport vessel each, two large and small submarines each, four large and small destroyers each and ten planes and purchase 40 pieces of new torpedo launchers with each to equip old and new vessels. In the sixth year, the plan was to construct four large and small destroyers each, two large submarines, four small submarines, one submarine carrier and transport vessel each, two large gunboats, six small mine sweepers and ten planes⁶⁶.

But the Navy was not able to implement the six-year plan because of a limited budget resulting from the government's lack of financial resources, financial needs of other national constructions, continuous internal strife and Japanese invasion as well as the arms embargo against China by foreign powers. The navy only managed to build 17 new vessels by the time the second Sino-Japanese War broke

out and among them 16 vessels were built by China itself. But all the vessels were small in its tonnage and were mostly gunboats for inland rivers and near seas. Their construction years, tonnage, horsepower and speed were as follows:

Vessel	Manufacturing year	Manufacturer	Length & width	Speed	Tonnage
Hsienning (Rivergunboat)	Aug. 1928	Kiangnan Arsenal	170Ft x 24Ft	17.5m/h	420-T
Yongsui (Rivergunboat)	Jan. 1929	Kiangnan Arsenal	225 x 30	18m/h	600-T
Minchuen (Rivergunboat)	Jan. 1929	Kiangnan Arsenal	200 x 26	17m/h	460-T
Yat-sen (Light cruiser)	Apr. 1930	Kiangnan Arsenal	270 x 34	20m/h	1,550-T
Minsheng (Rivergunboat)	Jan. 1930	Kiangnan Arsenal	205 x 26	18m/h	500-T
Ninghai (Cruiser)	1932	Japan	360 x 35	30m/h	2,498-T
Kiangning (Cruise gunboat)	1933	Kiangnan Arsenal	128-Ft long	10m/h	300-T
Haining (Cruise gunboat)	1933				300-T
Suining (Cruise gunboat)	1933				300-T
Funing (Cruise gunboat)	1933				300-T
Suning (Gunboat)	1934				300-T
Weining (Gunboat)	1934				300-T
Tsongning (Gunboat)	1934				300-T
Yining (Gunboat)	1934				300-T
Chengning (Gunboat)	1934				300-T
Changning (Gunboat)	1934				300-T
Pinghai (Heavy cruiser)	1937				2,555-T
Total: 17					11,283-T

Vessel	Horsepower	Draught
Hsienning	3,500hp	6 Feet
Yongsui	4,800hp	6 Feet
Minchuen	2,400hp	6 Feet
Yat-sen	4,000hp	11 Feet 6 Inches
Minsheng	2,400hp	6 Feet
Kiangning		10 Feet

Sources: Tso Wen-yi, *Chien-k'u chien-kuo shih-chi te kuo fang chün-shih chieh-she*, Taiwan Yuying Publishing Company, Taipei, 1984, pp. 142-144.

From the above list we can see that the Chinese Navy only added a total tonnage of 11,283 tons to its fleet between the period after the Northern Expedition and the break out of the second Sino-Japanese War. It is few in number but the progress was fast compared to the construction of two vessels with a total tonnage of 540 tons between 1919 and 1929.

Except for the construction of new vessels, the Naval Ministry also expanded the marine corps. The Chinese Marine had only two independent regiments in 1927 and reorganized them as two brigades the next year. According to the organization set in 1933, each marine brigade commanded two infantry regiments and one artillery company⁶⁷. After 1929, the Naval Ministry also prepared to organize naval aviation facilities and purchased first four amphibious trainer-planes from Germany. Later, the Ministry assembled more than one dozen amphibious planes at the naval plane manufacturing factory at Mawei in Fukien, for the purpose of training, reconnaissance and air battle. And as the Sino-Japanese war broke out, the Chinese Navy owned more 20 aircrafts, mostly only for the purpose of training and reconnaissance⁶⁸.

In summary, the major achievements of the National Government in its military reform and renovation during the "Golden Decade" were the accomplishment of the military nationalization policy, the reorganization of the Army and renovation of its equipment, and the establishment of the Air Force. Although there were also a few achievements in the establishment of the Navy, they could not match those of the Army and the Air Force because the vessels were too few and too small, mostly gunboats for inland rivers and near seas, while China has widespread territorial waters. The basic reason the Chinese Navy could not have glorious achievements was that the government did not have the huge amount of money needed to buy ocean-going battleships. Besides, all the armed forces had to renovate their facilities and equipment at that time. The National Government could not help but give first priority to the modernization of the Army and the Air Force with its limited financial resources, thus the development of the Navy was set aside. Attesting by historical facts later, this policy decision made by the government proved to be very wise. This also demonstrated that the far-sighted wisdom of the leadership in charge of the military renovation and reforms had stored strong combat capabilities for the forthcoming fight against the invading Japanese army.

VI. CONCLUSION

We can deeply understand from the above discussions that China faced a very difficult situation after the Northern Expedition. Under the dangerous international situation of Japanese and Russian invasions one after another, Northeast China fell into the enemies' hands and North China would imminently fall. The

government also had to face the segmentation by the militarily strong regional commanders and Communist rebellion. However, the National Government overcame the various difficult situations within a short ten-year period. They pushed through Dr. Sun Yat-sen's ideal of five-power constitution, organized a government perfect in its function and system, reformed local administration by tightening the local administrative organization and enabling the government policies and orders to be carried out from the county level down to the grassroots of villages and towns, completely nationalized the military, and established a well-trained Air Force with high morale. The government retrieved the tariff autonomy and repelled extraterritoriality, conducted railway and highway constructions, built up heavy industries, and achieved successful monetary reforms. We cannot help but praise these historical miracles.

Historians today refer to this period of various achievements made by the National Government as the "Golden Decade," obviously it gives the precious decade high appraisal. However, if with further study, we can discover that the reason why the National Government could break through all the difficulties during the short ten-year period and achieve tremendous performances is none else but the right leader we had at that time. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek applied fully his unswerving and fearless spirit, tolerant and generous Confucian aspirations, as well as far-sightedness, endured what the ordinary people could not do, and devoted his mental energy to fully pursue the task of national build-up with dedication and determination, and thus created the brilliant and glorious achievements during the decade and created a brand-new turning point for the Chinese nation. Thus when we look back at this part of Chinese history, we have to pay our sincerest respects to this great leader!

Secondly, the outstanding achievements during these ten years also lie undeniably in the successful reform of the Chinese Nationalist Party. The Kuomintang completely eradicated its shortcomings of loose organization and complicated membership, conformed to modern trends, reformulated its platform to pursue the ideals of the modernization of China, and absorbed elites of the society, making it the political party that best suited the needs of the national situation and modernization of the time. Most precious of all was that the Kuomintang thoroughly reviewed the defects of Chinese politics after the establishment of the Republic of China and resolutely discarded the parliamentary system which resulted in confusion and division. It adopted the gradual process to reform by first implementing the Political Tutelage and then establishing an army that aimed at modernizing the country and fulfilling political ideas. They used the military

backing for the overthrow of the warlords and the reunification of China. In the eyes of most people at that time, these measures were against the right principles and could not be understood by quite a few intellectuals. But when we look back at this period of history, it fully demonstrates that those measures and reforms were extremely necessary and very appropriate. Otherwise, internal confusions and chaos would not be ended quickly and the construction of modernizing the nation would not have been pushed through smoothly.

Furthermore, considering the entire historical trend, the basis for success during the "Golden Decade" actually lies in the surging trend of nationalism. Because of the severe invasions of the Japanese and Russian imperialists and the continual rebellions of warlords, people throughout the country, particularly the intellectuals who were in leadership positions in society, really felt that the nation was facing its last moment of life and death, so they had to give up selfishness and thrust themselves forward to face the challenge and sacrifice themselves for the nation and the people. It was under this enthusiastic nationalism and the organization and leadership of the Chinese Nationalist Party, that we saw the grand alliance of the old, middle-aged and young generations of the Chinese people form a tremendous torrent, to fight foreign invaders, wipe out warlords, reunify China and accomplish the great achievements during the "Golden Decade".

NOTES

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